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bulletin

Institute for the Study of the USSR

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Renewed Attacks on the National Bourgeoisie

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The Atom and China

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Strained Grain Production Targets for 1961

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The Soviet Harvest – The Prospects

and

Other Topics from the Current Soviet Scene

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bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR

August 1961

ARTICLES

Renewed Attacks on the National Bourgeoisie

GEORG A. VON STACKELBERG

At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Soviet views on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the anticolonial national liberation movements of the countries of Asia underwent radical modification. The Congress condemned the "sectarian errors" of those Soviet orientalists who referred to the attainment of sovereignty as "the final compact between the grand bourgeoisie and imperialism" and depicted the national bourgeoisie as "the true ally of imperialism in its campaign against the toiling masses."[1] Although articles which appeared in the Soviet press after the Twentieth Party Congress made the reservation that the social revolution in these countries could only be fully realized under the leadership of the proletariat, it was acknowledged that in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt and certain other countries "the proletariat–the vanguard of patriotic forces–has not yet taken over leadership and the sovereignty of these countries was won under the guidance of the national bourgeoisie."[2] There was a modification of the hitherto negative Soviet attitude toward the national bourgeoisie, which has continued to feature in Soviet publications until recently, although since the Twenty-First Party Congress there have been signs that a new attitude toward the national bourgeoisie of both non-Communist Asian countries and the young independent states of Africa was being formed. In articles on the national bourgeoisie and its progressive role in anticolonial movements, the assertion that only the proletariat can assume leadership of the national liberation movement and bring it to its conclusion have become more frequent.

Khrushchev's statement at the Twenty-First Party Congress that after settling their general national problems, peoples freed from colonial rule would seek to

[1] *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, 1956, No. 1, p. 8. See also *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 7, pp. 3–10.
[2] *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, 1956, No. 1, p. 8.

resolve urgent social problems, pointed to the need for a continuation of the struggle, but a struggle directed more against those of the bourgeoisie who impede the implementation of social reforms than against the colonizers. Although the progressive role played by the national bourgeoisie in the achievement of sovereignty by former colonies has not been denied, attempts have been made to belittle it by referring to it as an interim phenomenon in the long-term development of the independent non-Communist countries of Asia. Another sign of the Soviet government's diminishing sympathy toward the national bourgeoisie was the statement by Soviet African experts that, in the countries south of the Sahara, the logical champion of independence is not the national bourgeoisie but the working class, and that a direct transition from feudalism to the non-capitalist path of development may well occur.

The Moscow Declaration of Communist Parties of December 1960, while acknowledging that the national bourgeoisie may be progressive in that it "has an objective interest in achieving the main tasks of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution," pointed out that it is at the same time unstable and "inclined to be conciliatory toward imperialism and feudalism."[3] A recent issue of *Problemy vostokovedeniya* states: "In the light of the ideas contained in the Declaration, it is the duty of Soviet scholars to reveal the equivocal nature of the national bourgeoisie, . . . to show the different degrees to which it participates in the revolution, and to analyse the essential contradictions now manifesting themselves in various countries."[4]

Various periodicals have published articles containing direct attacks on the national-bourgeois governments of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, the UAR, the Sudan and other countries for engaging in domestic policies which retard social progress.[5] The national bourgeoisie of the Near and Middle East is accused of "inconsistency" and of showing an "incapacity to solve the land problem democratically in favor of the peasantry by eliminating the feudal landowning system."[6] The national bourgeoisie of the non-Communist Asian countries is accused of deliberately guiding revolutions which have overthrown imperialist rule in such a way as to separate the anti-imperialist movement of the masses from the antifeudal movement.[7] Soviet experts on Indian politics have once again set about discrediting Gandhism, on the grounds that it channeled the revolutionary energy of the broad masses into the overthrow of British imperialism without enabling the peasants and workers to oust the landowners and capitalists in the process. This view of Gandhism is consonant with its earlier definition as "a reactionary political doctrine," published in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* before the reinstatement of Gandhism by the Twentieth Party Congress.[8]

[3] *Pravda*, December 6, 1960.

[4] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, p. 11.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 13–34; *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1961, No. 4, pp. 38–51; *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1961, No. 3, pp. 3–5.

[6] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, p. 13.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[8] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. X, 1952, p. 203.

The accusation is now leveled that, having established itself as leader of the national liberation movement and consolidated its political power, the national bourgeoisie has, in a number of countries, saved the landowning class from liquidation from below.[9] It is also charged that the national bourgeoisie is constantly attempting to isolate the workers' movement from the peasant movement, the anti-imperialist from the antifeudal, thereby depriving the working class of its chief natural ally–the peasantry.[10] The Communist leaders therefore view the agrarian reforms carried out in various Afro-Asian countries as half measures aimed at pacifying the peasants' revolutionary struggle.

Thus it is claimed that the reforms carried out in India since 1947 have benefited only the richer peasants. This statement was echoed by A. K. Ghosh, General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party, at the Sixth Party Congress held at Vijayawada in April 1961. Referring to the semi-stagnation of Indian agriculture, Ghosh stated that "this weakness cannot be overcome without radical agrarian reforms," presumably meaning confiscation by the state of all the land belonging to landowners and prosperous peasants.[11] Ghosh also accused Nehru's government of engaging in a policy of bourgeois nationalism. In an article published in *Pravda* before the Congress, he reproached the government for accepting huge loans from the USA and other Western states, encouraging independent capitalist industrialization, refusing to nationalize British undertakings, making concessions to foreign capital and refusing to nationalize the banks, while permitting the bonds between big businessmen and landowners and members of the Indian National Congress to become stronger, thereby hindering the development of democracy in India.[12] These charges are reminiscent of Stalinist references to India as "a unitarian landowning bourgeois state."[13] They also clearly reflect the Moscow Declaration, which stated that the main objective of national revival in countries freed from colonial dependence was to restrict and oust foreign monopolies from the economy.

The latest issue of *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, while following the same line, is compelled to admit that, since they became independent states, India, Burma and other countries have effected considerable changes in the proportions of foreign and national investment.[14] An article in this journal dealing with the national bourgeoisie of the Southeast Asian countries quotes statistics to show that in India 62–63 percent of all investments in 1957 were national and that the Indian national banks accounted for 86 percent of all deposits, 82 percent of all credits, 90 percent of all investments in government stock and 80 percent of all banking reserves. The journal is also forced to confirm a similar situation in Burma, where 85 percent of all industrial enterprises in 1954

[9] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, p. 14.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Pravda*, April 12, 1961.
[12] *Ibid.*, April 5, 1961.
[13] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. XVIII, 1953, p. 75.
[14] *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1961, No. 4, pp. 41 ff.

were owned by local capital, compared with 38 percent before the war.[15] These two examples clearly refute Soviet propaganda claims about new forms of Western economic colonialism. Nevertheless, Soviet economic experts are intensifying their attacks on the national bourgeoisie, claiming that, despite the gulf which separates the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, the policy of the national bourgeoisie toward foreign capital is indecisive and inconsistent.[16]

According to Soviet economists, the indecision of the national bourgeoisie is directly related to the slow and inconsistent implementation of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the Southeast Asian countries, which should lead to the establishment of people's democracies in place of the national bourgeois states, such as exist now in India and Burma.[17] The fact that the national bourgeoisie in these states is consolidating its position and impeding the progress of these countries along the path to national democracy and eventually to a Soviet-type socialism is a further reason for the nature of the present campaign against the national bourgeoisie. Even the "guided democracy" in Indonesia fails to satisfy the Soviet leaders. Although the Communists received no posts in President Sukarno's cabinet, they were represented in other governmental bodies and at first the attitude of Indonesia's Communist leaders was one of complete support for Sukarno. Immediately after the formation of this Cabinet, Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party D. N. Aidit stated that the people of Indonesia would give its entire support to the new Cabinet provided the latter did not impede the development of the democratic movement.[18] At the same time, Aidit reserved the right to criticize equivocal policies and to attack those ministers whose actions damaged the cause of the people. Half-way through 1960, however, the attitude of the Indonesian Communist leaders suddenly changed. The Communist newspaper *Harian Rakjat* published a statement critizing Sukarno's cabinet and declaring that the implementation of the cabinet's three-point program for the year had not come up to expectations. It was noted that the Minister of Trade had oriented foreign trade in favor of Western countries, which accounted for 90 percent of such trade. The Minister of Labor was accused of failing to protect the economic interests of the workers and ignoring the democratic rights of the trade unions; the Foreign Minister was criticized for inconsistency and speeches defending the imperialists and, in particular, for his statement that there were no issues outstanding between Indonesia and the USA; the Minister for Home Affairs was upbraided for failure to democratize the system of government in villages. The Soviet journal *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* alleges that the military authorities in Indonesia took advantage of the state of emergency to prevent the distribution of this statement and certain members of the Communist Party were attacked.[19]

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[17] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, pp. 7–8.

[18] *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1961, No. 3, p. 5.

[19] *Ibid.*

Some indication of the change in the Soviet attitude is to be found in the fact that this statement by the Politburo of the Indonesian Communist Party was not published in the Soviet press until March 1961, some time after the Moscow Declaration had accused the national bourgeoisie of being unstable. The March issue of *Problemy vostokovedeniya* extended the accusations leveled against members of Sukarno's cabinet to the entire Indonesian national bourgeoisie. It claimed that since Sukarno had come to power no fundamental changes in land ownership had taken place and the position of the majority of the peasants had not improved. The article was very skeptical of the new agrarian reform planned by the Indonesian government on the grounds that the national bourgeoisie cannot consolidate its dominant position without effecting compromises which are bourgeois in aim, antifeudal in nature, anti-peasant in method of reform and injurious to the unity of the peasantry. For these reasons, the article claimed, the agrarian reform proposed in Indonesia would not remove the powerful landowners as a whole, but only those who are foreign.

Further evidence of the cooling of Soviet sympathy for the national non-Communist governments of Southeast Asia is to be found in the attacks made by the *Literaturnaya gazeta* on Nehru for his statement in April of this year that India cannot and will not judge who is right and who is wrong in the international situation which has arisen over events in Cuba.[20]

Soviet theoreticians have now launched even fiercer attacks upon the national bourgeoisie in the Arab countries–the UAR, Iraq, the Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco. The governments of these countries, like those in Southeast Asia, are indicted on the grounds that their agrarian reforms do not remove the big landowners but merely restrict them.[21] According to Soviet experts, the position of workers in the Arab countries has shown little improvement in the last 8–10 years. It is even suggested that most of the peasants in the Arab countries are faced with a possible deterioration of their position.[22] The same article predicts that the internal political life of the Arab countries will be characterized by an inevitable intensification of the class struggle in the rural areas, resulting eventually in the replacement of the existing national bourgeois states by national democratic states.[23]

An article by General Secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party F. Nassar in the February issue of *Sovremenny vostok* indicates the attitude of Arab Communist leaders to the national bourgeoisie. The article states that owing to the fact that the national liberation struggle of the Arab peoples is at present being conducted under the leadership, or with the active participation, of the bourgeoisie, all changes in these countries which benefit the working class or the peasants have nevertheless taken place within the framework of capitalism and have been effected primarily in the interests of the bourgeoisie.[24]

[20] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 4, 1961.
[21] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, p. 17.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[23] *Sovremenny vostok*, 1961, No. 2, pp. 10–12 and 18.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Nassar accuses the governments of the UAR and Iraq of showing a growing tendency to come to terms with internal reactionary elements and imperialist capitalism as social contradictions increase.[25] His main charge is that they persecute local Communists, which he regards as a policy aimed at undermining the independence of the Arab countries. These views are clearly a mere repetition of contentions expressed in the Moscow Declaration, which stated that the desire of reactionary circles to disrupt the national front and isolate the Communists under the standard of anti-Communism is sapping the strength of the national movement, is opposed to the national interests of the people, and threatens the loss of what has so far been achieved. This statement was also echoed by Ghosh, who accused "reactionary and opposition forces," including members of the ruling Indian National Congress, of uniting to persecute the Communist government of the State of Kerala.

*

The Soviet leaders' resumption of a negative attitude to the national bourgeoisie of the non-Communist Asian and North African countries is closely related to the comments in the Moscow Declaration regarding the present favorable international and internal conditions for the formation of "national democratic states" in many countries. This term, of course, means states freed from foreign dependence in whose government Communist and pro-Communist elements are predominant despite the presence of the bourgeois parties. The term provides a further stage in the Communist theory regarding the development of a colonial country into a proletarian dictatorship. According to Communist doctrine, a national bourgeois revolution, i.e., a revolution freeing a country from colonial dependence and leading to the establishment of bourgeois rule, should be followed by a bourgeois democratic revolution, which leads to the formation of a coalition government with Communist participation. The bourgeois democratic structure should in turn undergo transition into a "national democracy," in which the Communist party is dominant.[26] (It is interesting in this connection to note that Guinea and Cuba are already being referred to as "national democracies" in Soviet literature.)[27] The national democracy should then be followed by a people's democratic revolution, such as those which took place in China and various East European countries, which culminates in undivided Communist rule. This is the pattern prescribed for the transition of national bourgeois states such as India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia, into people's democracies like those which exist in China, North Korea and North Vietnam.

The assertion in the Moscow Declaration that this process is inevitable is primarily intended to undermine the authority of the present governments of non-Communist Asian and African states and to create a situation where the process may be developed. The Soviet leaders apparently consider that cooperation

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[26] *Malaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Small Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Vol. II, 1958, p. 33.
[27] *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1961, No. 1, p. 7.

with the national bourgeoisie in Asian and North-African states is nearing its end and that it is now necessary to intensify the internal struggle against the national governments with a demand for the creation of a "national democracy." This new trend explains the current stepping up of Communist propaganda attacks on the national bourgeoisie and the heightened activity of the Communist parties in Asia and North Africa. The military operations of the Pathet Lao in Laos and of Communist guerillas in South Vietnam are further manifestations of this policy. By means of a coalition of pro-Communist and national bourgeois forces, the Communists aim to weaken the latter and thereby hasten the transition of Laos into a "national democracy" and ultimately into a "people's democracy" of the North-Vietnamese type.

Speaking of the objectives of Communist policy, Lenin stated that "a politician conscious of his goal must learn to bring about this change . . . if he is convinced that there are profound and serious historical reasons for such a change."[28] The Soviet leaders are evidently convinced that the time is now ripe for a change in their attitude to the national bourgeoisie of the Asian and North African states. Certainly, this would in part explain the phrasing of the relevant section of the Moscow Declaration and subsequent trends in Communist policy in these countries.

[28] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Vol. XXVIII, 1950, pp. 170–71.

Joint Atomic Research in the Eastern Bloc

NIKOLAI KENT

Atomic researchers are among the most closely integrated workers in the Eastern bloc. In this sphere, the USSR is the giving partner, and without its liberal help intensive research into the uses of atomic energy in the other Communist states would be impossible.

Until the beginning of World War II, most of those countries that now are Soviet satellites had no basis worth mentioning for the conduct of atomic research. Only in the USSR and what is now the Eastern Zone of Germany were there centers of research into the various problems of nuclear physics.

Between 1945 and approximately 1952, the manifold military uses of atomic energy enjoyed a definite priority over peaceful uses. Although this priority still exists, the Soviet leaders are nevertheless also urging the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including those of the economy not only of their own country but also of the other countries of the Communist bloc. Prestige considerations are undoubtedly of importance here: Soviet scientists and politicians are proud of the fact that in 1954 the USSR was the first country to construct an atomic power station–an achievement that was followed up by Great Britain in 1956 and the United States in 1957.

Many of the most important experiments in nuclear physics demand extraordinarily complex, precise and bulky equipment which is costly to erect. The theoretical work involved is also extensive. On the basis of experimental results and numerous mathematical calculations of the highest degree of complexity, many highly-skilled scientists have to subject the data to the fullest treatment and examination. These facts give rise to the greatest difficulties even for the highly-industrialized countries, and it need not be stressed that these difficulties were formerly insuperable for the countries of the Eastern bloc. Under Stalin, Soviet atomic scientists, on the personal instructions of the dictator, did not work in cooperation with their colleagues in other Communist countries. Scientists in some of these countries , such as Professors M. I. Danysz and L. Infeld in Poland, Professor V. I. Votruba in Czechoslovakia and Professor A. Konja in Hungary, were indeed able to publish work of importance on certain aspects of research into nuclear physics, but until 1956 economic exploitation of the atom's energy reserves was out of the question. The situation did not change until the Soviet leaders ceased to look upon the satellites as simply subordinates and began to regard them to a certain degree as partners, whereby, of course, all political, economic and technical matters concerning Soviet cooperation with these countries were considered and decided in the light of the USSR's security requirements.

After Stalin's death, atomic scientists in the USSR started pressing their government to allow the Communist countries to cooperate closely in the field of atomic research in order to promote the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in the European and Asian satellites. Professor D. I. Blokhintsev and the late Professor D. V. Efremov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, repeatedly urged that this joint research be given the appropriate organization.

It was to promote the ever-growing need of the satellites for greater economic, military and technical efficiency that the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research was set up at Dubna, in the Moscow Oblast. This was the result of a resolution adopted on March 26, 1956, by authorized representatives of the Soviet, Czech, Polish, East German, Albanian, Bulgarian, North Korean, Mongolian and Rumanian governments gathered in the conference hall of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. At this meeting, the main principles and working methods of the new institute were decided upon and a first directorate elected, with Professor Blokhintsev as director and Professors Votruba and Danysz as deputy directors. North Vietnam became a member of the Institute in the summer of 1956 and Communist China and Hungary in the fall of the same year. In January 1959, Professor Blokhintsev was reelected director and Professors Wang Kang-chang (China) and Emil Dyakov (Bulgaria) became deputy directors.

Before 1956, atomic research establishments had already existed at Dubna under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The most important of them were the Institute for Nuclear Problems and the Electrophysical Laboratory, both of which possessed first-class equipment and staffs comprising some highly-qualified scientists. When the Joint Institute was founded, the Soviet government announced that it would place both of these institutions in their entirety at the Joint Institute's disposal free of charge.

The charter of the Joint Institute describes it as an "international scientific research organization" and states: "In all its activities, the Institute will contribute to the application of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the good of mankind." The Institute's task is to "conduct joint theoretical and experimental research in the sphere of nuclear physics by scientists of the member states of the Institute and to assist the development of nuclear physics in the member states through exchanging experience and the results of theoretical and experimental research," also to promote the training of scientists in the member states. It is worth noting that the charter provides for the possibility that scientists from non-member states will work at the Institute: this may well be intended to benefit in particular the less developed countries.

Article 6 of the charter guarantees the democratic running of the Institute. In all matters concerning the conduct of affairs, participation in research and profiting from its results, all member states are declared to be on an equal footing irrespectively of the contributions they pay toward the construction or installation of equipment, etc. Soviet scientists working there have refused to give Western colleagues visiting the Institute precise information concerning the membership

contributions paid by member states or the cost of maintaining the Institute; but Professor Blokhintsev has told visitors that the USSR pays 47 percent, China 20 percent and Albania 0.05 percent of all expenses.

Payments by Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are made in the form of deliveries of uranium ore, although Hungary has to pay her dues partly in cash since her exports of uranium ore are limited. On the basis of long-term authorizations granted to the planning commission chairmen by the councils of ministers of the countries concerned, the Soviet State Bank transfers the membership dues, i.e., the equivalent in value of the ore received, to the Institute.

The salaries of scientific and technical personnel are transferred by member states to Dubna, where they are paid out in Soviet currency, although about 10 percent has to remain in a private account of the country to which each employee belongs. Before the currency reform of January 1, 1961, scientific personnel received between 10,000 and 20,000 rubles a month; laboratory directors all received 20,000 rubles a month. It is not at present clear whether salaries at Dubna have been reduced by 90 percent–as have the incomes, savings and debts of Soviet citizens in general–since the introduction of the new Soviet currency; there are indications that the salaries of leading atomic scientists have been reduced by 77.5 percent, as have the prices for Soviet exports. This would mean that a scientist formerly receiving 20,000 rubles a month now receives not 2,000, but 4,500 rubles.

Despite the provisions of the Institute's charter, the USSR in fact determines the subjects of research. Officially, such questions are decided by the Institute's Scientific Council, which meets twice a year under the chairmanship of Director Blokhintsev; but so far this council has accepted all the Soviet proposals brought forward by Blokhintsev, for the representatives of the other Communist states are well aware that, with the exception of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, none of these states would be able to carry on research in this field without the assistance of the USSR.

The most important administrative decisions are made by a committee of representatives delegated by the governments of the member states. Decisions are carried by a two-thirds majority; all members take turns to preside. The Committee elects the directorate–the director for a term of three years, the deputy directors for two years. It also works out the Institute's budget and supervises expenditure. The director of administration is at the same time deputy Institute director and is in charge of the entire administrative and economic apparatus. Article 22 of the charter lays down that "the Institute directorate allows itself to be guided in its activities only by decisions of the Committee of Governmental Delegates from the member states and the Scientific Council and accepts no instructions whatever from single member states."

The charter also provides for the possibility of winding up the Institute, which is possible through an agreement between the member states. In this case,

all equipment, etc., would become the property of the USSR, other member states receiving financial compensation according to the capital they have invested.

The Institute comprises a number of laboratories, each of which is allotted a particular sphere of nuclear physics. At present, these are the following:

1. A nuclear research laboratory, which is the former Institute for Nuclear Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and has been working since 1949. Laboratory director and chairman of the Scientific Council: Dr. V. P. Dzhelepov (USSR); other members of the Scientific Council: V. P. Dmitrievsky, G. N. Flerov, I. M. Frank, E. Kats, M. S. Kosodaev, L. I. Lapidus, M. G. Meshcheryakov, V. A. Petukhov, V. Petrzilka, B. M. Pontecorvo, H. Pose, A. S. Siksin, Y. Kh. Smorodinsky, V. I. Veksler and Z. Wilhelmi.

2. A high energy laboratory. Director and chairman of the Scientific Council: V. I. Veksler (USSR); other members of the Scientific Council: M. I. Danysz, V. P. Dzhelepov, A. A. Kolomensky, M. A. Markov, M. G. Meshcheryakov, A. L. Minc, V. A. Petukhov, M. Y. Podgoretsky, B. M. Pontecorvo, I. Y. Tamm, T. A. Tanasescu, K. D. Tolstov, I. V. Chuvilo, Wang Kang-chang and Verle.

3. A laboratory for pure physics, directed by N. B. Bogolyubov (USSR) and possessing the largest electronic computing apparatus in the Communist bloc countries other than the USSR.

4. A neutron physics laboratory, directed by 1958 Nobel Prizewinner I. M. Frank (USSR).

5. A laboratory for nuclear reactions, directed by the Soviet nuclear physicist G. N. Flerov.

The Soviet members of the staffs of these institutions make frequent journeys to the various Eastern bloc countries for consultation or for the reading of lectures. These journeys are only in exceptional cases made publicly known, and only restricted numbers of leading physicists in these countries are allowed to attend. In 1959 and early 1960, Blokhintsev spent several weeks in China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; Tolstov, as an high-energy expert, was in Eastern Germany, and A. N. Logunov, as an expert for pure physics, in Bulgaria.

At the end of 1960, about two thirds of the permanent staff of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research were Soviet citizens. Apart from these permanent members, who are sent to Dubna by member states for at least one year, young scientists work there for shorter periods of between six and twelve months. In response to a Soviet proposal and in accord with the Committee of Governmental Delegates, the Scientific Council has recently decided to intensify the training of young scientists from those Eastern bloc countries where nuclear physics is still at an elementary stage.

The Institute's foreign department, which is under the immediate control of the Institute Director, sees to international contacts, not only with other Eastern bloc countries, but also with Western and neutral states, and also sends abroad reports of the Institute's work. The Institute also receives advance copies of

scientific publications and other information from almost all countries of the world. The foreign department, in which 30 to 35 qualified translators are employed, particularly for English and French, goes through all this material carefully and prepares it for the scientific personnel.

The housing and general services department, which comes under the Institute's administrative manager Sergienko, is responsible for the power supply for both technical and administrative purposes and for ensuring that foreign scientists are supplied with all their needs. The familiar shortages of everyday life in the USSR are unknown in Dubna: here there is no lack of goods or accommodation. Members of the Institute staff are accommodated in well-equipped and furnished apartment houses; many live in fine houses in the picturesque environs of the town. For their spare time, there is a modern club, a "House of Scientists," a cinema, a sports stadium, a swimming pool and a large sailing depot with rowing and motor boats as well as yachts. The town's environs are a paradise for those fond of hunting and fishing.

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There is a definite separation of functions between the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, which does not belong to Comecon, and the Permanent Commission for Nuclear Research and Technology founded at the Thirteenth Conference of Comecon, July 26–30, 1960 in Budapest. The former is concerned with fundamental research in the sphere of nuclear physics and the latter with all other questions of nuclear physics, chemistry and technology. This means primarily the establishment of scientific-industrial institutions for developing equipment and apparatus for the exploitation of atomic energy.

Within the framework of "socialist division of labor" in this sphere, Eastern Germany has been entrusted with the task of designing large-scale high-precision electronic equipment for measuring nuclear radiation and special tubes for such apparatus. This equipment is being built under the direction of Professor Werner Hartmann, himself a member of the Permanent Commission, at the Vakutronik enterprise at Dresden, which was established in 1955 for the purpose of "creating the conditions for applying the results of nuclear physics in science and technology." In addition to electronic measuring apparatus, Czechoslovakia produces radiation detectors, or counter tubes.

The Joint Institute at Dubna and the Permanent Commission cooperate closely in applying methods founded on the use of radioactive isotopes in industry, agriculture and medicine. The USSR is at present exporting large quantities of isotopes, especially for medical purposes, to the Communist countries of Europe and Asia, since these countries are themselves capable of producing isotopes only on a limited scale. Only in Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is the production of isotopes on a scale that is at all appreciable. About 120 different kinds of radioactive isotopes are produced at the Central Institute for Nuclear Physics at Rossendorf, near Dresden. This was made possible because an experimental reactor and a cyclotron were supplied by the USSR and installed by

Soviet specialists. The most important radioactive isotopes produced by the Rossendorf reactors are iodine 131, phosphorus 32, cobalt 60, gold 198 and iridium 192. As in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, only short-lived isotopes are produced at Rossendorf and these cannot be exported. (Exports from Eastern Germany to Bulgaria had to be stopped because the intensity of the radiation became seriously reduced after 6–8 hours.) Long-lived isotopes are exported by the Soviets to other Communist countries by air. Wider application of isotopes, especially in industry, is at present impossible in the Eastern bloc countries–with the exception of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia–since suitably-qualified workers are as yet unavailable.

At the beginning of this year, a Soviet proposal led to the establishment at Dubna of an information office for the purpose of providing member states with reliable information on the application of isotopes in industry, medicine and agriculture. For the purpose of promoting nuclear technology, it was agreed by the permanent secretariat of Comecon and the Institute at Dubna that members of the staff of the Permanent Commission for Nuclear Research and Technology should be able to make use of the Institute's equipment and premises. During the course of the year, further places are to be made available at the Institute for workers from the Permanent Commission.

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It is impossible to determine exactly the rate of extraction of uranium ore in the Eastern bloc countries, since all definite information is kept strictly secret. The largest deliveries are from Czechoslovakia, where most of the 8–10 mines are grouped around the city of Jáchymov, or Joachimsthal. Eastern Germany also exports large quantities of uranium to the USSR: here, deposits stretch along a line of about 200 kilometers with Dresden, Gera, Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz) and Erfurt as the main centers. About 250,000 people in Czechoslovakia and 180,000 in Eastern Germany are employed in mining uranium. The uranium mined in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland and Hungary is also largely taken by the Soviets, although the quantities concerned here are of less significance.

Uranium mining in the Communist countries is carried on by jointly-financed companies under the management of a Soviet managing director and a managing director appointed by the local government. In addition, the Soviets have concluded long-term leases–some of them until the year 2000 in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia–with various governments. It is noteworthy that cooperation in this sphere takes place only between individual Eastern bloc countries and the USSR, i.e., it is always bilateral, never multilateral, for the latter is undesirable for the Soviets.

On January 1, 1957, the prices paid for uranium were increased; the cost per ton exported from Eastern Germany is now about 2,800,000 East marks. Transportations of ore, which is exported to the USSR in its raw state, are carried out under strict military guard and enjoy absolute priority. According to the information available, the Soviets want to increase the total quantity of uranium ore

mined in the USSR and the rest of the Eastern bloc from about 11,000 tons in 1959 to 15,000 tons. Eastern Germany produced about 750 tons in 1960; this figure is to be raised to 1,000 tons per year. It may be taken as certain that stocks of uranium ore are much greater in the Eastern bloc than in Western Europe.

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At present, two thousand scientists from the twelve member states are employed in the Institute at Dubna: this year the number is to be increased. As for technical equipment, the Institute's 680-MeV synchrocyclotron in the Nuclear Research Laboratory and 10,000-MeV synchrophasotron made it possible to begin research into high-energy physics as soon as the Institute was founded. There is no doubt that the Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) near Geneva has been left behind. In the middle of May this year, Professor Blokhintsev stated in a TASS interview that a pulse reactor for fast neutrons, the only one of its kind in the world, had been installed in the Laboratory for Neutron Physics. In general, however, it is impossible to make any comparison between the nuclear energy installations in the Communist and free worlds for lack of complete information.

In addition to general problems of nuclear research, attention is being concentrated at Dubna upon the various aspects of generating electricity through atomic energy, since the use of atomic energy may well help to solve the acute coal problem in such countries as Eastern Germany and Hungary. The first atomic power station to be built under the Joint Institute's direction is at Rheinsberg, near Potsdam; this is to be completed by 1962. In order to enlarge their experience, scientists and technicians from Dubna were given an opportunity of observing the construction of the atomic power station at Novovoronezh, the capacity of which is estimated at 420 megawatts. As for other problems, little is being done at Dubna on the construction of reactors for marine propulsion, work on which is proceeding in the USSR independently of the Institute.

The Soviets are currently promoting bilateral collaboration between countries of the Eastern bloc in the exploitation of atomic energy. In early April 1961, a plan for such collaboration was signed in Budapest between Dr. Bertram Winde, Director of the East German Office for Nuclear Technology and Research, and Professor Lajos Janossy, Chairman of the Hungarian State Atomic Energy Commission. Director of the East Berlin Institute for Reactor Construction Professor Max Steenbeck (formerly Siemens), who spent the years 1945–55 as a specialist in the USSR, is at present conducting negotiations to secure close cooperation between Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia in the field of reactor construction.

Even so, one should not overestimate the significance of the fact that the Eastern bloc countries are cooperating in the work of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna. Not only from the standpoint of science in general but also as regards the future development of nuclear research and technology in each of the countries concerned, this joint venture, although of importance, is not as far-reaching as it might be.

The Atom and China

A. KASHIN

Ever since the seizure of the Chinese mainland by the Communists, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party has been exerting every effort to transform China into a modern industrial power. Considerations of prestige play an important part in the formulation of plans for industrial development and are also the reason for the dumping of Chinese goods on Asian markets in which the government indulges from time to time. By selling in these markets goods which the country did not formerly even produce, Peking endeavors to impress other Asian countries with the degree of industrial development that it has achieved. It is natural that in the pursuance of prestige both at home and abroad the Communist leaders could not afford to ignore such an important adjunct of modern industry as atomic research and the benefits which it offers. It is interesting to consider what the Chinese have done in this field in recent years and the approach adopted by the Communist leaders to the problem.

As far back as the beginning of the fifties, Western observers began to speak of the possibility that Communist China might possess its own atomic bomb in the very near future. These rumors found confirmation in the press of various Asian countries, particularly that of India. On February 11, 1953, the Calcutta newspaper *The People* reported that the Chinese Communists had set up an atomic research center in the Tarim Basin in Sinkiang, and that work there had reached a stage where the explosion of China's first atomic bomb might be expected in the next few months, if not weeks.[1] At the end of 1958, these rumors were again receiving attention in the Western press. On December 21, Richard Hughes wrote in the *Sunday Times* that it was believed that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide the Chinese Communists with maximum aid to assist in the production of China's first atomic bomb.[2] He suggested that this was being done to demonstrate the advantages of the Communist system, which enabled an Asian country to overcome its industrial backwardness in so short a period of time. To implement the project, it was reported that a joint Sino-Soviet atomic research center had been set up, again in Sinkiang, where preparations were already reaching the level necessary for staging an atomic explosion.

Since 1959, such reports have appeared with greater frequency. On November 1, 1959, the Indian *Statesman* published an article which reported intensified Sino-Soviet cooperation in atomic research and the formation of the first joint Sino-Soviet atomic research center in Sinkiang (Sinkiang features prominently in all reports which have appeared in the non-Communist press).[3] On January 5,

[1] *The People*, Calcutta, February 11, 1953.
[2] *Sunday Times*, London, December 21, 1958.
[3] *Statesman*, New Delhi, November 1, 1959.

1960, *Le Monde* forecast that the explosion of the first Chinese atomic bomb would take place at the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962.[4] At about the same time, the *New York Times* was even speaking of the construction, with Soviet aid, of China's first earth satellite.[5] The paper put the time required for completing this project at two years, and reported that the first rocket launching sites, from which such a satellite might be put into orbit, were already under construction in northwest China. The rockets required for this program would, it was inferred, be provided by the Soviet Union. The American paper saw confirmation of these views in the appearance in China of Dr. Hsue Shen-tsien, who is regarded as one of the world's leading specialists in rocket technology. Dr. Hsue was deported from the United States on the grounds that he had belonged to the Communist Party before his arrival in America. Finally, in January of the same year, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* quoted the American journal *Newsweek* as stating that the Chinese were preparing for the explosion of the first small Chinese atomic bomb in the Gobi Desert some time in 1960.[6]

It should be remarked that these rumors were not entirely without corroboration in the Chinese press, which has frequently referred to the subject in recent years. There is reason to suppose that in the fifties the Chinese Communists really believed that they would succeed in catching up with the more technically advanced Western powers and the Soviet Union in atomic research, and particularly in the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Not only the Chinese press, but also the statements of individual Chinese military leaders suggest this. At the end of 1958, Marshal Nieh Yung-chen said:

> In the not too distant future we should master the newest techniques concerning atomic fission, thermonuclear reactions, the use of atomic energy in all fields, radio and electronics, jet propulsion, rockets and the conquest of outer space. We should also master the new techniques of producing high-efficiency liquid and solid fuels and making precision and automatic machinery.[7]

It is interesting to note that the Chinese press too linked the production of China's first atomic bomb with the need to launch its first satellite. Evidently, the Chinese Communists regard these two problems as being very closely related and the solution of one as a major prerequisite for the solution of the other. Shortly before Marshal Nieh Yung-chen made the above statement, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Kuo Mo-jo was reported on Radio Peking as saying: "We are very willing to learn from Soviet scientists. Chinese scientists are determined to get China's artificial satellite into the sky at an early date.... The earlier that day comes the better."[8]

Such statements have appeared in the Chinese Communist press in fair numbers of late years. The question, however, remains as to whether they are

[4] *Le Monde*, Paris, January 5, 1960.
[5] *The New York Times* (International Edition), Paris, January 12, 1960.
[6] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 27, 1960.
[7] Hsinhua, August 2, 1958.
[8] Radio Peking, May 18, 1958.

merely propaganda assertions or whether there is some degree of justification for them. Undoubtedly there is a desire to possess an atomic bomb and to launch a satellite into space, but China does not possess the resources for either on her own. Thus the question arises as to whether the Soviet Union wishes China to acquire experience in the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy, and if so, what measures are being taken to furnish the necessary assistance. If the Soviet Union wished China to possess her own atomic bomb, there can be no doubt that the Soviet press would not have been silent on the subject, but so far there has been no mention of it. Nevertheless, in February 1955 Radio Peking reported that the Soviet Union was providing China with assistance in this field, including fissile uranium and equipment.[9] In June of the same year, Chinese atomic physicist Chao Chung-yao announced that the first atomic research center in China was being formed and that it would initially be supervised by Soviet scientists.[10] In September 1957, Radio Peking reported that the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute had built a 25 MeV cyclotron which would shortly be handed over to China.[11] In March 1958, the Hsinhua News Agency announced that the first atomic reactor to be built in China, again with a power of 25 MeV, had been completed with Soviet help. Work had also been completed on an electrostatic generator, a voltage multiplier and a beta-ray spectrometer.[12] In September of the same year, the first Chinese experimental reactor, cyclotron and electrostatic generator, together with more than 200 other items, were shown at an industrial and communications exhibition in Peking. The experimental reactor, which was of the heavy water type with a capacity of 7,000–10,000 kW, and the cyclotron, which can drive alpha-particles up to an energy of 25 MeV, were built by Chinese scientists and technicians with Soviet assistance.[13]

In August 1958, Radio Peking reported from Shanghai that a local factory had successfully produced a first batch of suits for protection against atomic radiation. The factory received an urgent oder for these suits from the Chinese Academy of Sciences late in June. One of the specifications had been for a visor made of rigid transparent plastic. The PVC material supplied by the Academy had been unsatisfactory, but the difficulty had been overcome by bonding PVC with organic glass.[14]

Further information was released in a long article published by *Jen Min Jih Pao* toward the end of 1959.[15] The article stated that the peaceful uses of atomic energy were now being gradually introduced into industry, agriculture, medicine, public health and various fields of scientific research. It also gave a brief history of nuclear research in China. Even before 1955, the Chinese had mastered some techniques and had conducted some nuclear research. In 1955, the Soviet govern-

[9] *Ibid.*, February 14, 1955.
[10] Hsinhua, June 5, 1955.
[11] Radio Peking, September 11, 1957.
[12] Hsinhua, March 3, 1958.
[13] *Ibid.*, September 14, 1958.
[14] Radio Peking, August 6, 1958.
[15] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, October 11, 1959.

ment had helped China to build her first reactor and accelerator. In 1956, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp had set up a Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, near Moscow. During this same period, Chinese scientists and technologists and Soviet scientists working in China had given a series of lectures to encourage public interest in atomic energy. The achievements of the Soviet Union in the atomic field had been demonstrated at exhibitions held in Peking, Shanghai, Canton and Chengtu. The application of radioactive isotopes in industry and medicine also began at this time. In 1958, as a result of the "great leap forward," many provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions had set up organizations to conduct atomic research. Many universities and institutes had set up departments and started courses for the study of problems connected with atomic energy. The use of radioactive isotopes was being extended in geological, machine-building, metallurgical, chemical, biological, medical and agricultural departments.

The article went on to describe the equipment which had been constructed, with the help of the Soviet Union, for the development of nuclear science and technology. This included the experimental heavy water reactor with a capacity of 7,000–10,000 kW which had been built in 1958 and a cyclotron capable of accelerating alpha-particles to an energy of 25 MeV. In addition, it was stated that a 2.5 MeV proton electrostatic accelerator and a high tension multiplier had been designed and built by the Chinese, an induction electron accelerator had been supplied by the Soviet Union and various other types of accelerators were in the process of being designed and produced.

The article reported that Chinese scientists were now intensively engaged in the study of nuclear physics, radiation chemistry, the production of isotopes and radioactive living matter. They had developed a heavy particle spectrograph and several beta spectrographs, also neutron and crystal spectrographs. With the aid of the latter, research had been conducted into the beta and gamma energy spectra of neutrons and fission physics. The composition of light atomic nuclei had been studied and discussed. Progress had also been made in the field of radiation detection instruments. Research had been carried out on nuclear emulsions and Geiger counters, as well as on the production of cloud chamber, scintillation crystal, ionization chamber, magnetic rotation, photomultiplier and other electron tubes. A cosmic ray laboratory had been built in southern China where a multiplate cloud chamber and a magnetic field cloud chamber had been installed. Many experiments had been carried out with this equipment. Chinese scientists had participated in the work of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, where they had used the particles produced by the world's largest 10,000 MeV proton synchrophasotron and the 680 MeV synchrocyclotron, the bubble chamber, emulsions and the Cherenkov counter.

In his book *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, Arnold Kramish gives details of the financial support which the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna receives.[16] Maintenance costs are shared, the Soviet Union furnishing 47.25 percent,

[16] Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, Stanford, Calif., 1959, p. 190.

Communist China 20 percent, Poland and East Germany 6.75 percent each, Rumania and Czechoslovakia 5.75 percent each, Hungary 4 percent, Bulgaria 3.6 percent, and Albania, North Korea and Mongolia 0.05 percent each. North Vietnam, while having a representative in the Institute's Scientific Council, makes no financial contribution. In return for their support, all the above countries receive the right to send their scientists to work at the Institute. Kramish doubts, however, whether this is of as much benefit to them as would at first appear:

> Although the articles of incorporation provide that Joint Institute officers be elected by majority vote, the Soviets apparently do not place any trust in the situation where a satellite scientist would be a director of one of the laboratories, and apparently the other members are forced to accept this situation. As far as the nonprivileged members are concerned, Dubna may simply represent a drain on their scientific resources, talents, and the limited amount of funds that they can afford to expend for scientific research.[17]

All the same, there can be no doubt that Communist China does derive certain benefits even under this disadvantageous arrangement. Chinese scientists who work at Dubna find themselves in the current of Soviet nuclear development, obtain valuable practical experience and have the opportunity to use equipment which does not exist in China.

It should be borne in mind, however, that all this is in the field of research and the Joint Institute is concerned primarily with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese press has made any mention of cooperation between the two countries on its military applications. Evidently, if China desires to possess its own atomic bomb, it will have to achieve this without the aid of the Soviet Union or that of the more industrially advanced satellites. Leaving aside the political significance of the situation for the moment, let us consider what possibility there is of China's realizing such a goal.

From the purely scientific point of view there is no real obstacle, since China does possess a number of noted nuclear and rocket experts, some of whom were educated in the United States and have engaged in nuclear research there. In 1952 one of them, Dr. Li Su-kwang, announced that China already had its own program for developing atomic and hydrogen weapons.[18] There are also a number of foreign scientists engaged on nuclear research in China. Official Communist sources have named at least one, Joan Chase, a Chinese woman of American origin who took part in work on the first American atomic bomb dropped on Japan.[19]

While the theoretical prerequisites for the production of an atomic bomb, even if only of the type used at Hiroshima, exist, there have as yet been no signs that one has been built or tested. The most logical reason would seem to be the rudimentary state of Chinese industry, despite the efforts of the last ten years,

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 190–91.
[18] *Sunday Times*, November 30, 1952.
[19] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, January 16, 1951.

and lack of the necessary capital. Financially, China is already hard pressed to meet payments for imports of grain from Canada and Australia while maintaining industrial production at its present level. Without an immense expansion of industry, work on nuclear weapons would be impossible, but such an expansion would require gigantic material and financial resources which at the moment China is not in a position to obtain.

There are other signs that confirm the view that China is unlikely to have an atomic bomb in the near future. At the time when the Soviet Union did not have nuclear armaments, Communist propaganda did all in its power to belittle the importance of such weapons. It is true that even after the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, Soviet propaganda continued to assert that atomic weapons alone could not ensure victory and that, as in the past, the decisive factor in war was the human element. Nevertheless, the derogatory attitude toward nuclear weapons was no longer in evidence, and it was fully acknowledged that nuclear weapons could cause mankind the most appalling damage. In 1953, Malenkov even stated that an atomic war would mean the end of civilization and there would be no victors in such a war. Even now, Khrushchev lays stress on the huge losses that a nuclear war would entail.

In this respect, Chinese propaganda today bears a marked resemblance to Soviet propaganda before 1949. It categorically denies that nuclear weapons can have any overall effect on the course of a new world war. A typical example of this approach is provided by a statement made by Chinese Communist leader Chang Chieh in August 1960:

> Atomic bombs are paper tigers with which the American reactionaries are trying to frighten the people. Of course, such bombs are weapons for mass murder, but what decides victory or defeat in war is the people and not one or two new weapons.[20]

The present Defense Minister, Ling Piao, also laid stress on the danger of overestimating the importance of nuclear weapons in a speech at a conference of Army political workers in 1960:

> We need both weapons and men, but we attach greater importance to the role of man. The spiritual atomic bomb, i.e., man's ideological consciousness and courage, is much more powerful and useful than the material atomic bomb. And only we can forge this spiritual weapon. Our enemies cannot. Therefore it is something which is ours alone; imperialism has no way to compete with us.[21]

It should, of course, be borne in mind that Chinese propaganda on the subject of nuclear war has two sides. Comments such as those quoted above are meant for domestic consumption. The Chinese people, and in particular the army, must be made to believe that in the event of a war an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons and rockets will have no advantage over Chinese forces with relatively primitive equipment. They must be convinced that the victory of the Communist

[20] *Kwangsi Jih Pao*, August 13, 1960.
[21] *Peking Review*, October 18, 1960.

cause is guaranteed despite the enemy's technical superiority. Propaganda intended for audiences abroad, particularly the peoples of Southeast Asia, strikes a very different note. One of its main features is the call to create an atom-free zone in the Pacific area. The danger which a nuclear war would present in this area, far from being minimized, is stressed to the greatest possible extent. An atom-free zone in Asia was first called for at a conference in Cairo in January 1958 and later in the same year Nehru demanded the establishment of such a zone in the Pacific area. Khrushchev turned to this subject in his speech to the Twenty-First Party Congress in January 1959:

> The Pacific Ocean has become the main testing ground for American atomic weapons. All this makes imperative the need to avert war, particularly atomic war, in this part of the world. There would seem to be a better chance here than elsewhere, as the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as well as India, Indonesia, Burma and other states in this area are championing the cause of peace. Their joint stand for prohibition of atomic weapons and their testing could be of decisive help in preserving peace in the Pacific. The initiative of these countries would be supported by the people of Japan and other countries of the Pacific Basin. A zone of peace, and above all a zone free of atomic weapons, can and must be established in the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin.[22]

The Chinese press reacted to this statement with a long article in *Jen Min Jih Pao* expressing full Chinese solidarity with Khrushchev's proposals. However, both the Soviet proposals and the Chinese supporting statement were so vague that it remained uncertain what the leaders of the two Communist states understood by the term "Pacific Basin." At first the areas concerned appeared to include the Indochina peninsula, India and China, but it was not clear whether they might also extend to certain Far Eastern areas of the Soviet Union. A Moscow Radio broadcast of January 30, 1960, further specified North Korea, Indonesia and Burma. Communist China, on the other hand, went considerably further. In an interview he gave in April 1958, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Kuo Mo-jo had already suggested the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and even parts of South America.[23]

An atom-free zone continues to figure prominently in Chinese propaganda and is brought up every time relations between China and her Asian neighbors are under discussion. Premier Chou En-lai also had a great deal to say on the subject at a reception held in the Swiss embassy in Peking in 1960:

> We advocate that the countries of Asia and others around the Pacific, including the United States, conclude a peace pact of mutual non-aggression and turn the whole of this area into a zone free of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, a direction in which efforts will have to be made for a long period, but we will exert ourselves unremittingly to this end.[24]

[22] *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.
[23] *Peking Review*, April 18, 1958.
[24] Hsinhua, August 1, 1960.

Whether the Chinese Communists genuinely hope to reach agreement on this problem is difficult to say. Recent events and statements suggest rather that the propaganda campaign conducted in conjunction with the Soviet Union is aimed more at discrediting American nuclear tests in the Pacific and making impossible the use of nuclear weapons in any war that might break out in this part of the world. By means of propaganda, the Chinese Communist Party hopes to create such a psychological barrier against the use of these weapons that it would be impossible for the Western powers to employ them.

All in all, it would seem that the reports which have appeared in the Western press of impending Chinese atomic explosions are decidedly premature. Chinese industry is certainly not sufficiently advanced to carry through a program of nuclear armaments, even allowing for the possible possession by China of considerable scientific knowledge of the subject, without Soviet aid. This the Soviet leaders seem reluctant to provide. Certainly there is no definite evidence of collaboration between the two countries on production of nuclear weapons, or of the Soviet Union's offering to supply China with the necessary aircraft or missiles which would be required to make them effective. Moreover, the tone of Chinese propaganda indicates that in a possible war the Chinese armed forces can look forward to no indigenous nuclear support and that the Communist leaders would prefer simply to have the use of nuclear weapons prohibited. Unfortunately, the rumors which have circulated in the West have undoubtedly affected the policies of certain countries of the free world, misleading not merely journalists and the general public, but even responsible statesmen.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Agriculture

Strained Grain Production Targets for 1961

The planning of a country's economy entails the elaboration of a system of measures which are properly integrated with one another, whose feasibility is guaranteed and which are normally founded upon the latest achievements of science and technology. Above all, due account must be taken of requirements on the one hand and of the available resources on the other. When, therefore, the Soviet government and Party adopted the measures that they did to prevent a recurrence in 1961 of the agricultural setbacks that had occurred the previous year, one may well have asked oneself how it was that the very country that was the first to adopt a planned economy was now, thirty-three years later, abandoning it as soon as it encountered serious difficulties.

After the Central Committee's plenary meeting of January 1961, at which the difficulties of Soviet agriculture were fully aired, Khrushchev embarked upon a tour of the country's most important agricultural regions, which resulted in the adoption of a number of obligations in various areas to produce and surrender to the state certain quantities of agricultural produce in 1961. During May and June, the obligations adopted by all the Union republics except the RSFSR were published in the Soviet press. Since these obligations were given after the spring sowing, or at least the main preparatory work for sowing, had been completed, it was possible to some extent to foresee the possibility of their execution; in fact, however, the targets set are so high as to be scarcely attainable even if the harvest is carried out in model fashion. It may therefore be assumed that the obligations were given under pressure from local Party organizations. So far from being the result of efficient planning, then, the obligations constitute a task imposed by the Party, failure to execute which will entail for local agricultural workers consequences similar to those that followed upon the grain difficulties of 1960.

The obligations concern not only cereals but also meat and dairy produce, potatoes, cotton, etc. Since, however, the cereal group–especially as understood in Soviet statistics–comprises a variety of crops, including legumes, used for both human and animal consumption, it will be enough to consider the commitments made regarding the cultivation and surrender to the state of crops in this group. Production and state deliveries of cereals in the USSR as a whole in the years 1956–60 and the quantities promised for 1961 are as follows (to the nearest hundred thousand tons):

	Total Production		State Deliveries	
	Tons	Percentage of Preceding Year	Tons	Percentage of Preceding Year
1956.....	127,600,000	—	54,100,000	—
1957.....	105,000,000	83.0	35,400,000	65.0
1958.....	141,200,000	134.0	56,900,000	162.0
1959.....	125,900,000	89.0	46,600,000	82.0
1960.....	135,600,000	108.0	46,700,000	100.2
1961*	165,100,000	121.8	62,300,000	133.0

* Quantities promised.

SOURCES: *Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheshy shornik* (Soviet Agriculture: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1960, p. 198, and the table below.

It will be noticed that the only year in which the increase in grain production over the preceeding year exceeded that planned for 1961 was 1958, which was the best year in respect of grain production in the whole of the last decade, just as 1957 was the worst, while the absolute quantities promised for 1961 actually exceed those obtained in 1958 by over 20,000,000 tons. The ambitiousness of the 1961 obligations becomes even more apparent when they are compared with the actual figures for 1959 according to the various Union republics:

	Total Production		State Deliveries	
	1959	Promised for 1961	1959	Promised for 1961
	Tons		Tons	
RSFSR	69,638,000	94,540,000	26,912,000	35,000,000
Ukrainian SSR	27,517,000	35,246,000	7,379,000	11,065,000
Kazakh SSR	19,085,000	23,000,000	11,473,000	14,754,000
Moldavian SSR	2,391,000	2,344,000	316,000	492,000
Belorussian SSR	1,958,000	2,809,000	185,000	250,000
Lithuanian SSR	977,000	1,185,000	2,800	65,000
Azerbaidzhan SSR.....	855,000	1,030,000	130,000	130,000
Georgian SSR	819,000	1,159,000	25,000	165,000
Kirghiz SSR	613,000	1,020,000	63,000	130,000
Latvian SSR	611,000	824,000	26,000	65,000
Uzbek SSR	562,000	737,000	107,000	130,000
Estonian SSR	353,000	453,000	1,600	30,000
Armenian SSR	235,000	282,000	2,600	30,000
Tadzhik SSR	232,000	322,000	14,000	30,000
Turkmen SSR	59,000	120,000	100	16,000
Total	125,905,000	165,071,000	46,637,100	62,352,000

SOURCES: *Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheshy shornik* (Soviet Agriculture: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1960, pp. 94—95 and 210—11; *Pravda*, January 11, 1961; *Selskaya zhizn*, May 28 and 30, June 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18 and 20, and July 1, 1961.

The following observations may be made on the basis of these figures. Kazakhstan is supposed to be increasing its total grain output this year by nearly 4,000,000 tons over the 1959 level and its state deliveries by 3,281,000 tons, so that it will have for its own needs something over 8,240,000 tons, of which 3,900,000 tons will be required for seed, not to mention the quantities required for feeding the population of over nine million and the republic's livestock. Even more remarkable is Turkmenia's obligation to double her grain output as against 1959 and to surrender to the state 160 times as much as in that year. If the republics undertake such obligations and the central government accepts them, Khrushchev's

complaints of demands by the republics for the return of part of the grain surrendered to the state would appear to be unjustified. The large increases in grain output promised by the RSFSR and the Ukraine are evidently to be achieved by increasing their output of corn. In 1960, the Ukraine produced 2,900,000 tons of this crop and in 1961 proposes to increase this to 15,000,000 tons, which is not far short of half her entire cereal output. Corn output in the RSFSR was 2,200,000 tons in 1960 and is to be 7,500,000 tons this year. In 1959, four republics–Lithuania, Armenia, Turkmenia and Estonia–were virtually freed from the obligation to surrender grain to the state. This year, these republics intend to effect considerable increases in both total output and state deliveries of cereals. It is not entirely clear how they are to do this: Armenia and Turkestan cannot produce enough grain to satisfy the needs of their own population, and if they succeed in effecting the increases promised, the amount of grain per head of the population that will be left for the whole of the year will be respectively 150 and 70 kilograms.

It therefore seems clear that these obligations were given, not as the result of careful thought on the part of those responsible for them, but under pressure, i.e., that they are not founded on a proper estimate of the resources available. The main point, however, is that whether the republics succeed in fulfilling their promises with regard to total grain production or not, they will be obliged to surrender the promised amounts to the state. We have already described in these columns the new system of controlling state purchases of agricultural produce, whereby an army of state inspectors is entrusted with the task of ensuring that the contracts for delivering produce to the state are carried out.[1] If they succeed, it is the local population in the agricultural areas that will have to pay for the thoughtless commitments undertaken under pressure from their Party leaders.

V. Kungurtsev

The Soviet Harvest—The Prospects

The speeches made by Khrushchev on the agricultural situation prior to the Central Committee plenary session of last January indicated that he had gathered plenty of evidence of serious shortcomings with which to confront those Party officials responsible. The crisis was such that even before the plenary session a number of emergency measures had been drawn up and, in part, implemented. These included reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and its branch organs, a plan for the overhaul of the state agricultural purchasing apparatus, and formation of a new body to supply collective farms with equipment and fertilizers. A reshuffle of top-ranking Party officials responsible for agriculture was begun: Minister of Agriculture Matskevich was among the first to lose his post and the entire leadership of the Central Committee department for agriculture was

[1] *Bulletin*, 1961, No. 6, pp. 22–27.

replaced. After the plenary session, the ministers of agriculture in nine Union republics were removed and in some of the republics Party and government leaders not directly concerned with agricultural policy fell victims to the purge. Some of the latter were expelled from the Party and threatened with trial on charges of fraud and deliberate deception in their reports on the agricultural situation in their respective areas. The purge is still continuing.

Once again, as in previous years, the Soviet leaders decided that the answer to the crisis must be measures to secure a heavy increase in grain production, which is regarded as the key to progress in all branches of Soviet agriculture. Consequently, immediately after the January plenary session, at which a resolution to this effect was passed, a massive propaganda campaign was launched in the countryside to stimulate preparations for the spring sowing. In the Moscow Oblast alone, 700 agitation groups, composed of experienced Party and governmental workers and specialists, were organized,[1] while in the Ukraine a special association was formed to provide assistance to collective and state farms by securing the cooperation of industrial enterprises in the repair of agricultural machinery and by encouraging mechanization, under the patronage of industry.[2]

This spring, however, the traditional grain-growing regions of the Soviet Union were left to rely on their own resources to arrange for the spring sowing, while the attention of the authorities was concentrated on improving conditions for agricultural work in the virgin lands, especially on the state farms of Kazakhstan. Top priority has been given to delivery of machinery in sufficient quantities to guarantee that for every thousand hectares sown there are not less than eleven tractors, three combines and three trucks.

To speed up construction of farm buildings, housing accommodation and other amenities in the virgin lands, large numbers of special teams were dispatched from the main Soviet industrial centers, and fifteen of these, each containing 200 men, were already in action by the beginning of May.[3] In addition, a new soil study institute was set up and charged with surveying an area of 13 million hectares of virgin land by the spring of 1962, after which each state farm will receive a detailed soil chart with recommendations on how best to exploit its land.[4]

To help swell the labor force during harvest time, a special decree has been passed which restores the incentive of a 15 percent wage bonus for all those willing to take up permanent work in the virgin lands. This measure had been first introduced at the start of the virgin lands campaign in 1954–55.[5] The Ministry of Defense also instructed army units to direct servicemen demobilized under the recent reduction of the armed forces to permanent work on collective and

[1] *Pravda*, March 17, 1961.
[2] *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 29, 1961.
[3] *Pravda*, April 28, 1961.
[4] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, May 7, 1961.
[5] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1961.

state farms in the region.[6] Finally, an extra 2,000 million rubles over and above the previously-fixed budget figure has been allocated for the cultivation of the virgin lands, although it appears from articles which have been published in the Soviet press that even the normal budget appropriations have not been fully used every year.[7]

This year, spring sowing in Kazakhstan was completed two weeks earlier than in 1960, and 24 million hectares of spring crops were sown, including 17 million hectares of wheat. The area under buckwheat has been greatly increased and, at Khrushchev's express command, 17,000 hectares of sugar beets for cattle feed have also been sown. By May 25, 12,700,000 hectares of wheat, 1 percent more than the planned figure,[8] had been sown in the virgin lands, but in the rush to meet sowing deadlines there was from the start considerable neglect of scientific methods, which had given rise to serious anxiety about the harvest,[9] and even Kazakhstan Party Secretary Kunaev felt compelled to express his dissatisfaction in the press.[10]

Information on the state of the harvest in Kazakhstan is as yet very scanty, but it is the first time that early sowing has been carried out in this region on a large scale and many Soviet experts are convinced that when spring arrives early, especially in the northern parts of Kazakhstan, it is advisable to delay large-scale sowing until the middle of May, particularly on land which is heavily prone to weeds, so that the latter can be cleared before sowing takes place. Experience has also shown that April sowing results in yields two to three centners less per hectare, and in some cases crops are lost owing to the invariable June droughts.[11] Academician Lysenko was alone in recommending, during his tour of the virgin lands in 1960, that the spring sowing be carried out as early as possible in order to protect the harvest from early winter frosts and snow, but evidently his advice has been accepted by Khrushchev. This year, quite apart from Party directives, the early spring brought forward the sowing period as compared with preceding years: 24,300,000 hectares had been sown by April 20–some 9 million hectares more than by the same date in 1960. But after this date the speed of sowing began to decline rapidly, and by May 20 only 103,900,000 hectares (5,200,000 less than in 1960) had been sown, and sowing was not finally completed until June 10, ten days later than last year. However, according to the Soviet press, the plan was slightly overfulfilled, with a total sown area of 132 million hectares.[12] Unfortunately, this early sowing, combined with the hot weather, has caused a heavy growth of weeds on the virgin lands, and it is reported in the Soviet press that in many places wheat has become choked with weeds which it is too late to clear.

[6] *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 11, 1961.
[7] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, May 16, 1961.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, May 10, 1961.
[10] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1961.
[11] *Osvoenie tselinnykh i zalezhnykh zemel* (Cultivation of Virgin and Marginal Lands), Moscow, 1956, p. 195.
[12] *Selskaya zhizn*, June 14, 1961.

The same is true, apparently, of some areas in the Ukraine, where "crops on collective farms are drowned in weeds."[13] The corn crop is one of the biggest sufferers in this respect, and state farm managers in the Kokchetav Oblast are accused of "merely paying lipservice to the importance of the corn harvest, while failing to look after it."[14] On many farms the corn is so badly overgrown with weeds that the individual rows are indistinguishable.

There is also plenty of evidence that preparations for the harvest are suffering as much this year as last from bad planning and delays, and in some areas the situation is said to be worse than in 1960. One of the main causes is lack of machinery. Even in the southern Ukraine, large numbers of tractors and combines have not been repaired in time,[15] and it is reported from Irkutsk Oblast that two-thirds of the combine fleet has still not been put in working order. This slow rate of progress is giving rise to fears of a repetition of last year's heavy losses, when much grain was still standing in the fields at the onset of winter.[16] In the Virgin Lands Krai and Pavlodar Oblast, only about a quarter of the available combines had been overhauled by July 10, as compared with 40 percent last year, while in the adjacent Kokchetav and Kustanai oblasts many thousands of combines, reapers, grain cleaners and other machines are awaiting repair.[17] On some farms in Kokchetav Oblast, repair teams have not even been organized, since farm managers are awaiting arrival of mechanics from the Ukraine and the southern RSFSR. Some state farms are not even troubling to repair any of their old machinery, preferring to rely on receiving new machines in time for the harvest.[18]

This failure to renovate machinery is, in fact, due not so much to negligence as to lack of spare parts, although nearly 800 Soviet factories are engaged in production of the latter. It appears that as much metal is being expended on manufacture of spare parts for tractors as is used to produce new machines. Yet, despite the shortage, chaotic planning in "Selkhozsoyuztekhnika," the body responsible for supplying agricultural machinery, has resulted in an enormous quantity of unnecessary spare parts worth millions of rubles accumulating in depots and being written off as scrap metal.[19] The main reasons why agricultural machinery becomes unserviceable so quickly on Soviet collective and state farms are negligent storage, careless use, and repair by poorly-qualified mechanics. Every year, tens of thousands of seasonal tractor drivers and combine operators arrive in the virgin lands from all over the Soviet Union, and on their departure, mountains of wrecked machinery are left lying on the farms.[20] Recently, 123,000 tractors and 60,000 combines, many of which would have given several more

[13] *Pravda Ukrainy*, May 24, 1961.
[14] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, July 5, 1961.
[15] *Pravda Ukrainy*, June 27, 1961.
[16] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 4, 1961.
[17] *Pravda*, July 12, 1961.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, June 25, 1961.
[20] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, June 24, 1961.

years' service, were written off as scrap in this way.[21] As Kazakhstan Party Secretary Kunaev has commented:

> A considerable proportion of it [agricultural machinery] is used unproductively; some is dismantled for spare parts for other vehicles, taken out of service or written off. There is no method in the assignment of machinery. Many state farms continue to order machines in excess of their requirements.[22]

In any case, the situation regarding tractor drivers and mechanics remains as acute as last year: according to Soviet estimates, the Tselinograd and Pavlodar oblasts need 100,000 mechanics for the harvest, but by July they had only 40,000.[23] This year's early spring and the increased area under barley and other crops which ripen quickly have brought harvesting time forward. Yet every attempt over the last few years to form permanent teams of drivers and mechanics in the virgin lands has foundered owing to chronic fluctuation of the labor force, caused by bad working and living conditions, the climate and, last but not least, by the fact that much of the labor for the harvest is composed of young people who have been compulsorily drafted to the virgin lands.

Despite the negative factors mentioned above, the Soviet press is optimistic about this year's harvest prospects. Heavy crops are reported in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, Moldavia and in many oblasts along the Volga,[24] and every effort is being made to bring in the harvest with as little delay as possible. Two and even three reapers are being attached to each tractor and combines and tractors are being driven at speeds varying between 16 and 18 kilometers an hour[25]–with the result, however, that as much as a quarter of the grain is left on the fields. Over-hasty work on picking up and threshing the corn is causing losses of up to 30 percent,[26] and in the case of overripe corn, up to 50 percent.[27] In early July it was reported that large amounts of grain are left behind on the roads on the way to reception points; in the Northern Caucasus, for example, the roads leading to Krasnodar are so thickly strewn with grain dropped from the trucks that it can be collected in sackfuls.[28]

It is evident that this year's drive to achieve the greatly increased target for grain production is beset by precisely the same obstacles as in 1960: faulty planning and organization, failure to observe the elementary rules of agricultural practice, uneconomic use of machinery and personnel, even where they are available, and general negligence. If the republics are to meet the obligation imposed on them by the Party planners, the most strenuous efforts will be required.

S. Kabysh

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[21] *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, June 25, 1961.
[22] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, June 9, 1961.
[23] *Pravda*, July 12, 1961.
[24] *Selskaya zhizn*, July 8, 1961.
[25] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 8, 1961.
[26] *Pravda*, July 11, 1961.
[27] *Selskaya zhizn*, July 12, 1961.
[28] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 7, 1961.

Military Affairs

The Strategic Importance of Soviet Inland Waterways

The importance attached in the USSR to the development of a coast-to-coast network of inland waterways and the emphasis placed by Soviet propaganda on the economic consequences of this development invite speculation on the ultimate motives which prompted the Soviet government to undertake this costly program of construction. One motive frequently suggested by Western observers is the strategic desirability of direct communication by water between the seas bordering the USSR. This is supported by the fact that the tremendous cost of carrying out such a program is not easy to justify economically. Despite the construction of giant plants, the generation of electricity by water power in 1957 was planned to make up no more than 16.4 percent of the total output, the rest being accounted for by thermal stations.[1] The linking up of waterways in the European USSR has not led to a corresponding development of inland navigation, which represented 24.8 percent of the total volume of traffic in 1913 and only 5.3 percent in 1958,[2] while the absolute increase during the same period from 28,900 million to 85,500 million kilometer-tons was chiefly due to increases in lumber floating and the transportation of building materials to construction sites.[3] Little as yet is to be heard of the results of irrigation schemes, with the exception of a few projects in the southern and Central Asian republics, which for the most part are not connected with the development of inland waterways.

The seemingly disproportionate cost of developing the USSR's inland waterways in terms of both finance and labor prompts one to ask whether other aims, possibly of a strategic nature, are not thereby being pursued. The Soviet desire for maritime recognition became evident before World War II with the launching of an ambitious shipbuilding program providing for the construction of battleships, cruisers, numerous destroyers and submarines. This program was resumed in 1945 and pursued energetically, with the result that although modern developments have led to a reorientation toward rocket weapons and atomic power, the USSR has succeeded in making herself, quantitatively speaking at least, the second naval power of the world. According to *Jane's Fighting Ships*, the Soviet Navy at present possesses about 2,900 warships, including 32 cruisers, 180 destroyers, 500 submarines and over 2,000 minesweepers, submarine chasers, E-boats, etc. Since, however, the USSR's naval forces have to be divided into four independent fleets, which in an emergency can be neither combined nor appreciably reinforced by transferring ships from one to the other, the total number of warships is in reality not so important as it might at first appear. The Arctic and Far East fleets have a tenuous communication link round the north of Siberia, but those in the

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[1] Karl Krüger, *UdSSR — Unser Wissen über die Sowjetunion*, Berlin, 1957, p. 351.

[2] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu: Statisticheskiy sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1958: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1959, pp. 543, 550–51 and 564–65.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 564–65.

Baltic and Black Seas have to be prepared for the possibility of being isolated in time of war. It is therefore evident that a direct link between the Black Sea, the Arctic and the Baltic would enhance the striking power of the naval forces stationed in each of them and make it possible to adopt a more offensive naval policy than is at present feasible.

The military importance of inland waterways lies partly in their ability to facilitate the bringing up of reinforcements. The order in which the construction of such waterways is undertaken shows, however, that this particular function is not regarded as being of primary importance. The strategic significance of the inland waterways lies rather in the possibility of transferring naval forces from one theater of operations to another. For this purpose, however, only two communication systems need be considered: those linking the Arctic with the Baltic and both of these with the Black Sea and the Caspian. Naturally, the strategic importance of these routes depends on their size and general capacity, since this limits the number and size of vessels which they can take.

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The Black Sea–Baltic Waterway, which in the north joins the waterway linking the Baltic and White Seas and so in effect communicates with the Arctic as well, has a total length of about 4,500 kilometers. Its four main sections are:

1. The Lower Don from its mouth to Kalach. At Tsimlyansky there are two locks of similar dimensions to those on the Volga-Don Canal. Below this point, the channel has to be dredged. The entire stretch from Kalach to the sea is reckoned as a third-class waterway.[4] In 1957, the minimum depth of fairway was 2.8 meters and radius of curves 350–600 meters. It is planned in the next few years to increase the depth by further dredging to 3.3 meters,[5] and to construct three more locks, but the work will not be completed before 1970.

2. The Volga-Don Canal, 101 kilometers in length, with 13 locks. The surface width varies between 70 and 80 meters, and the depth between 4.1 and 4.3 meters.[6] The locks have a working breadth of 18 meters and a depth of water of about 3.65 meters, possibly more.[7]

3. The Volga from Stalingrad to the Rybinsk Reservoir is a first-class waterway which by the construction of six locks has been converted into a series of giant reservoirs. In 1957, according to the Waterways Authority, the minimum

[4] The inland waterways of the Soviet Union are divided into seven classes, the first three being reckoned as major waterways. Those in the first class have a mean depth of more than 3 meters, a minimum depth of more than 2 meters and a 600–1,000 meter minimum radius of curves. Those in the third class have a mean depth of 2.4–1.8 meters, a minimum depth of 2.0–1.2 meters and a 350–600 meter minimum radius of curves.

[5] *Rechnoi transport*, 1957, No. 11, pp. 41–43.

[6] *Ibid.*, 1960, No. 3, p. 37.

[7] These figures are estimated on the basis of a diagram that appeared in *Rechnoi transport*, 1960, No. 3, p. 34.

depth of fairway was between 3 and 3.2 meters. By 1965, after the completion of a lock at Cheboksary, this should be increased to 3.75–4 meters.[8]

4. The Mariinsky Canal System, which begins at Cherepovets, with the disemboguement of the Sheksna into the Rybinsk Reservoir, continues *via* the Beloe Lake and joins the Baltic–White Sea Waterway at Lake Onega. In its present form, it has a total length of something less than 400 kilometers and includes 43 locks, which, although with a uniform depth of 2.13 meters, are of varying length and breadth. The smallest locks are 10.5 meters wide and 77 meters long.[9]

After World War II, a start was made on the construction of a completely new system of canals linking the Volga with the Baltic. This is to comprise several canals and a total of nine locks, of dimensions equal to those on the Volga-Don Canal. The work is still dragging on: according to the latest information, the system should be brought into operation in 1963 and completed in 1965.[10]

The system connecting the Baltic with the White Sea begins near Leningrad, proceeds *via* the Neva, Lake Ladoga and the Svir River to Lake Onega, which is connected with the White Sea by the White Sea Canal. Soviet specialized literature is almost entirely silent on the subject of this system, but it is known that since the canalization of the Svir River the section between the Baltic and Lake Onega has been open to vessels with a carrying capacity of 5,000 tons, i.e., the minimum depth of fairway is 2.8–3.0 meters and the radius of curves at least 675–700 meters. The bottleneck of this system is the 227-kilometer-long White Sea Canal, with 19 single- and double-chamber locks, mostly built of wood. Its southern section was heavily damaged in World War II, but was restored in 1946. In 1953–58, extensive modernization was carried out, in the course of which the old wooden sluicegates were replaced by steel ones, the concrete foundations reinforced and the wooden ribbing of the lock walls entirely replaced.[11] In addition, the canal was regulated and rocks obstructing navigation were removed by means of explosives. At the same time, the locks were adapted for automatic electric remote control, for which two additional power plants are under construction. Despite these improvements, however, the canal can still only be used by vessels with a carrying capacity of about 2,000 tons,[12] i.e., vessels with a length of about 90 meters, a beam of 13 meters and a draught of 2.8 meters. It may therefore be confidently assumed that the working width of the locks is no more than 14 meters and the depth of water does not exceed 3 meters.

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[8] Calculated on the basis of the draught of the largest motor cargo vessels operating in these waters, which have a capacity of 5,000 tons and draw about 3.5 meters.

[9] V. N. Borodin, *Novye vodnye puti : Sotsialisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya vodnogo transporta* (New Waterways: The Socialist Reconstruction of Water Transportation), Moscow, 1932, p. 23.

[10] *Rechnoi transport*, 1959, No. 3, pp. 28–31.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1958, No. 8, pp. 28–29.

[12] *Ibid.*, 1958, No. 6, pp. 18–21.

In order to complete the picture, the following points should be noted.

1. Because of freezing up in winter, Soviet inland waterways are navigable on the average for 180–185 days in the year.

2. The water level is determined by the melting snows in the spring and the relatively small rainfall in summer and early fall. It rises by leaps and bounds in April, reaches its highest point in May and then falls quickly to reach its lowest level at the end of June. Then it remains more or less unchanged, depending on the rainfall, until the fall. At high water, the reduced height of the bridges constitutes the main obstacle, at low water the reduced depth. The most advantageous condition is reached between the end of May and middle of June and again, unless the winter begins unduly early, in October.

3. The minimum depth of fairway and working width of locks provide an indication of the size of vessels using the waterways only when taken in conjunction with the security regulations. According to these: (a) the length of the vessel may not normally exceed one fifth of the smallest radius of curves on the waterway, with the exception of specifically indicated reaches, where it may equal one third of the radius of curves; (b) in a fairway up to 3 meters deep, the clearance under the vessel must be at least 15 centimeters; over 3 meters deep, at least 20 centimeters. In the case of canals, the minimum clearance is respectively 20 and 30 centimeters; in that of locks built of concrete, it is 30 centimeters when the depth of water is less than 2.5 meters, 50 centimeters when the depth is over 2.5 meters. In addition, the clearance in such locks between vessel and lock wall is to be respectively 40, 50 and 100 centimeters when the working width of the lock is 10, 20 and 30 meters.[13]

4. According to A. A. Soyuzov, the draught of the largest vessel permitted to use a given waterway is reckoned as being over 50 percent greater than the minimum depth of the waterway at low water, in order to make better use of the waterway's capacity.[14] (This regulation deserves particular attention since it provides a more reliable indication of the capacity of a waterway than data on canal construction or regulation, which are often not entirely accurate.) Apart from the big oil barges with a carrying capacity of up to 12,000 tons, which with a draught of about 3.5 meters are used only on the Volga, the largest vessels envisaged by Soviet construction plans for the country's inland waterways, including the route from the Baltic to the Black Sea, are diesel-driven cargo boats with a carrying capacity of 5,000 tons dry cargo and about 5,700 tons liquid cargo. These have a maximum draught of 3.5–3.55 meters, which implies that the minimum depth of water on the Baltic–Black Sea route does not exceed 2.8–3 meters.

5. It is important to remember that the development of Soviet inland waterways has not resulted in their becoming, like the Kiel Canal for example, navigable

[13] *Pravila tekhnicheskoi ekspluatatsii rechnogo transporta SSSR* (Regulations for the Technical Use of River Transportation in the USSR), Moscow, 1956.

[14] A. A. Soyuzov, *Organizatsiya raboty rechnogo flota* (Organization of the Operations of the River Fleet), Moscow, 1957.

for seagoing ships. Seagoing vessels, with the exception of small coastal craft, continue to be barred from using these waterways on account of their relatively great draught and high superstructure, so that goods have still to be transshipped from river craft to seagoing ships at ports. Since only small coastal vessels can penetrate inland, the claim that Moscow became a "port on five seas" after the completion in 1952 of the Volga-Don Canal and the occasional reports of parades of naval vessels in the capital are no more than tricks of propaganda.

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The capacity of inland waterways to accommodate warships passing from one sea to another is naturally limited by the minimum physical dimensions of any of the system's sections. Even after 1970, the minimum depth of the Baltic–Black Sea System will probably be little more than 3 meters. Until 1963–65, the smallest locks on the Mariinsky section will continue to be no more than 77 meters long, 10.3 meters wide and 2.13 meters deep, and on the Lower Don section the length of vessels will be restricted by the 350–600 meter radius of curves. The Baltic–White Sea System will similarly be limited by locks with a width of about 14 meters and a depth of about 3 meters.

Details of the Chief Types of Soviet Warships

	Displacement		Length	Beam	Draught	
	Standard	Full Load			Mean	Maximum
	Tons		Meters			
Cruiser "Sverdlov" Class	15,450	19,200	206.7	21.0	4.8	7.3
Destroyer "Kildin" Class	3,000	—	127.0	13.0	—	4.6
Destroyer "Kotlin" Class	2,850	3,885	127.5	12.5	—	4.8
Destroyer "Tallin" Class	—	3,500	129.9	13.2	—	4.6
Destroyer "Skory" Class	2,600	3,500	126.0	12.3	—	3.9
Submarine "Z" Class	1,850	2,250	93.0	8.4	—	5.1
Submarine "W" Class	1,050	1,300	73.5	7.2	—	4.2
Submarine "Q" Class	650	800	54.0	6.3	—	4.3
Submarine "M-V" Class	—	350	50.2	4.8	—	3.6
Frigate "Riga" Class	1,200	1,600	88.5	9.4	2.9	3.3
Minesweeper "T 43" Class	530	—	60.0	8.2	—	2.7
Submarine Chaser "Kronstadt" Class	300	—	50.2	5.8	—	2.7

SOURCE: *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1959—60*, London, 1960.
NOTE: The full load displacement and draught of submarines refer to when they are surfaced.

It will be seen from these figures that only the smaller types of seagoing vessels can at present use the inland waterways. Owing to the bottleneck of the Mariinsky Canal System with its small locks, the Baltic–Black Sea System is navigable only for small vessels such as submarine chasers, torpedo boats, minesweepers and perhaps coastal submarines of the "M-V" class. After the completion of the new Volga–Baltic Waterway and the canalization of the Lower Don, the size of vessels traveling between the Baltic and the Black Sea will be limited by the dimensions of the locks on the Volga-Don Canal and the Volga–Baltic waterway. They will then also include, at a generous estimate, submarines of the "Q" and "W" classes, frigates of the "Riga" class and destroyers of the "Skory" class. Even so, it will

be necessary to reduce their draught by about one meter either by partial dismantling or by the use of pontoons. Modern destroyers of the "Tallin," "Kotlin" or "Kidlin" classes could only be allowed to use the waterways after everything removable had been dismantled, including the masts, radar equipment, fire control equipment and armaments. Cruisers are out of the question. The White Sea Canal remains unnavigable for modern destroyers and submarines of the "Q," "W" and "Z" classes.

Since smaller vessels are designed mainly for the defense of home coastal waters and since the naval superiority of an enemy would permit the latter to choose his point of attack, it is very unlikely that the Soviet naval command envisages the likelihood of laying a part of the Soviet coast bare by withdrawing any considerable number of coastal defense craft. Even if the enemy were to concentrate his forces to attack a particular point, the bringing up of small naval vessels through the inland waterways would not be easy and would, moreover, require one or two months to complete.

The strategic transfer of warships is linked with even greater difficulties. Since the passage from Rostov-on-Don to Leningrad takes from 25 to 30 days, the transfer of a considerable number of destroyers or submarines would inevitably mean that several vessels would be engaged in the waterway system simultaneously. Such a movement in wartime could scarcely escape an enemy's notice, and there would be a danger of enemy air attacks on locks and dams that would leave the ships high and dry far from the sea. Moreover, such vessels would have to be dismantled and subsequently reconstructed, and this would necessitate their being laid up for considerable lengths of time both before and after the journey. A rapid and effective concentration of warships by this means is, therefore, impossible. In peacetime, the voyage round Western Europe or the Norwegian coast remains the best solution of such problems.

It is quite possible that during the planning stage and until the end of World War II, or even until Stalin's death, the Soviet naval command was active in promoting the development of the USSR's inland waterways as a means of linking up the seas by which the country is bordered. Today, however, when the main arteries of this inland system are still awaiting final completion, it is clear that the development of modern weapons has rendered obsolete the views which led to this strategic development of the Soviet inland waterways: in the last ten or fifteen years, the character of naval fleets has changed through the development of rocket weapons, of atomic power and electronic devices. Although battleships and many cruisers have become obsolete as the main weapons of naval attack, their place is being taken not only by aircraft carriers but also by large destroyers and submarines, whose dimensions are constantly growing through being armed with rockets and modern weapons for defense against air or submarine attack and in many cases through their conversion to atomic power. It is noteworthy that in World War I the average displacement for destroyers was about 1,000 tons and in World War II about 2,000 tons, while today the 3,000-ton level is already felt to be inadequate. Many modern destroyers, including

some in the navies of the United States and Italy and also the latest types of Soviet destroyer, have reached the size of light cruisers. Submarines are showing a similar tendency: in World War II, most of them had a standard displacement of less than 1,500 and often less than 1,000 tons, while the use of atomic power and rocket armaments today leads to the construction of submarines with a displacement of 4,000 and more tons. Naturally, these developments impose considerable limitations upon the strategic usefulness of inland waterways.

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The present attempt at an appraisal of the strategic importance of the USSR's inland waterways should not be interpreted as being designed to depreciate the work that has been done in this field in the USSR. The development of a network of waterways and the construction of numerous high-capacity hydroelectric power stations represent an achievement which will exert a favorable influence upon the country's economic development and sooner or later repay the original cost. Even from the military point of view the new waterways signify an advance, since they permit ship movements that were previously impossible.

M. P. Nitzki

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

The centenary of Rabindranath Tagore's birth, which occurred on May 5, was marked in the Soviet periodical press, as in the daily press, by a flood of articles. Little was reproduced of the poet's own writings, which the pre-Revolutionary Russian intelligentsia first came to know in translation on the eve of World War I, when Tagore received the Nobel prize for literature. (The first volume to appear in the Russian language and bearing his name was the verse collection *The Gardener*, which produced a great impression upon the Russian reading public and made its influence felt in literature, theater and art.) Apart from the verses published in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, which were mentioned in these columns in the issue for May of this year, poetry by Tagore was published in the fifth issues for this year of *Druzhba narodov* ("The Age of a Poet," in a translation from the Benghali by A. Gorbovsky), *Novy mir* ("My Songs") and *Oktyabr* ("The Harvest," from the English translation made by Tagore himself). There was also a little in the daily press.

It was announced that the centenary would also be marked by the commencement of a twelve-volume edition of Tagore's works. The announcement stated that the edition would comprise the poet's best works, including various verse collections, poems in prose, novels and short stories, including some hitherto unpublished in a Russian translation, literary criticism, selected press contributions and memoirs.

There is no need to mention by name all the articles that appeared in conjunction with the anniversary: suffice it to say that some were contributed by the poet's compatriots, while the rest came from the pens of a variety of people in the USSR, including the Chairman of the Peace Defense Committee and member of the World Peace Council, Nikolai Tikhonov, and the former Minister of the Far Eastern Republic and Chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, F. Petrov. The most frequent subject was Tagore's visit to Moscow in 1930, of which *Molodoi Kommunist* (1961, No. 5) says:

> In September 1930, R. Tagore came to the Soviet Union. "I don't want to die before I have seen the Soviet Union," he said. The writer spent thirteen days in Moscow and during this time met students and Pioneers, talked with kolkhozniks, playwrights and artists. The result of the trip to this country were the *Letters on Russia*, which are full of enthusiasm for the feats of the Soviet people: "Everything that I saw astonished me. In eight years, education has changed the spiritual face of the entire population .... There are so many people and such lightning changes that one can scarcely imagine it all. The heart is gladdened when it sees how the river that has been dry for centuries has filled to overflowing, thanks to education. Everywhere life seethes ...

Such sayings of Tagore's are quoted in plenty. After having been met by F. Petrov, an old Bolshevik whose reminiscences of the event contributed to the stream of publications marking the centenary, and having received from him the information which the Soviet government deemed necessary, Tagore stayed in the USSR for thirteen days and proceeded to form hasty conclusions which can only astonish the unbiased reader. In 1930, the intelligentsia was being mercilessly oppressed; the peasantry was groaning under the reign of terror which accompanied collectivization; people withdrew into themselves and were afraid to let drop an unnecessary word, for fear of being thrown into prison or a forced labor camp. According to some articles on Tagore, the Russian people under the Communist regime straightened backs previously bent by slavery, and everywhere struck the observer by their air of freedom and independence. This, according to Tagore, is to the credit of the Soviet regime. Tagore was evidently under the impression that Russia before the Revolution was a country of utter slavery, and his remarks in this vein are plentifully reproduced in the Soviet press. He would have done well to remember that the eighteenth-century Russian scholar, poet and scientist, M. V. Lomonosov, was the son of a peasant from the White Sea littoral; that Maxim Gorky, who sprang from the dregs of Russian society, was active as a writer before the Revolution; that Chaliapin came from a modest *milieu* on the Volga; that the famous Kazan Sobor in Leningrad, now an anti-religious museum, is the work of the early nineteenth-century architect Andrei Voronikhin, a former serf liberated by Count Saltykov.

The articles on Tagore in the Soviet press show, of course, an attempt to identify him with materialism, to deprive him of the idealistic and religious views with which, in fact, his work is permeated. Some found among his writings certain lines which may be interpreted as indicating that he favored the use of force when striving for the ideal life. Others made use of his assertion that religious bigotry was worse than atheism, in order to portray him as siding with the enemies of religion.

Such a presentation of the great Indian poet, philosopher and writer can only be regarded as a distortion of the true character of one who was misled on the subject of Russia and the Soviet Union by those with whom he was brought into contact during his brief stay on Soviet territory.

Lolly Lvov

Three Studies of Khrushchev

The Red Phoenix
By HARRY SCHWARTZ

The Grand Tactician
By LAZAR PISTRAK

Khrushchev—A Political Portrait
By KONRAD KELLEN

All published by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

Before Stalin's death, and even immediately afterward, Khrushchev was one of the Soviet political leaders least known in the West. Foreign observers, preoccupied with more famous names such as Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, paid him little attention. Yet now this peasant from Kursk Oblast has risen to the top, having consigned his better-known rivals to political oblivion on the way.

All these three books are closely related in their subject matter. Harry Schwartz analyzes general developments in the Soviet Union since World War II, Lazar Pistrak describes Khrushchev's career before Stalin's death, and Konrad Kellen concentrates on events since Stalin's death, with particular reference to the personality of Khrushchev.

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Schwartz's book is, in fact, a collection of his articles previously published in the American press: here they are supplemented with a certain amount of connecting material which gives them a general unity. The author is particularly concerned with the gigantic technological progress which has taken place in the Soviet Union since 1945. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union lay in ruins and the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons. Five years later, the balance of forces had been rudely shaken by the news that the Soviet Union had succeeded in exploding its own atomic bomb. Schwartz considers the underestimation of Soviet capabilities to be a basic weakness of the free world. As late as 1948, not only Western politicians but scientists too were of the opinion that the Soviet Union would be unable to manufacture an atomic bomb for at least 5–7 years.

> One measure of the extent of this underestimation is given in the published hearings of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer before an Atomic Energy Commission Special Personnel Security Board. Writing in April 1948, Dr. Oppenheimer had predicted that "for a long time to come" the Soviet Union would not achieve significant atomic armament (page 204).

But even the appearance of the first Soviet atomic bomb did not awaken the free world to the danger that faced it. The widespread belief that this achievement was due solely to information gained by espionage led public opinion in the West to an erroneous assessment of the technological capabilities of the Soviet Union. Few people realized what an enormous amount of technical apparatus and personnel, including physicists and other specialists, were necessary for the construction of such a bomb. The West also ignored the tremendous social improvements which had taken place in the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.

Schwartz is quite right in pointing out that these achievements were not due solely to the Communist regime. Even before the Revolution, Russia possessed many scientists of world renown and a great scientific tradition. With the introduction of universal education, the foundations for future success were laid.

In his concluding chapter, Schwartz raises the question of the future: Will Khrushchev really be able to keep his promises to "bury the West"? Schwartz accepts this threat in all seriousness. Provided there is no war or other major setback, the economy and industry of the USSR will, by the beginning of the seventies, reach a level at which it will become a serious menace to the West. Schwartz dismisses the objection that even then the standard of living in the Communist countries will still be far behind that of the West. He considers that the crux of the matter lies in the development of technology and heavy industry. If the Soviet Union and the Communist camp in general succeed in overtaking the West in this respect, the fate of the latter is sealed. The author is not blind to the weaknesses of the Communist system, but he is convinced that its strength at present outweighs its weaknesses. He exhorts the West to renounce its superiority complex *vis-à-vis* the Communist camp. The West considers itself the "right side," but right is not in itself a guarantee of victory.

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In his biography of Khrushchev, Pistrak is confronted from the very outset with difficulties. Did Khrushchev actually work in the coal mines and, if so, in what capacity? What role did he play in the Civil War? The Soviet press provides contradictory answers to all these questions. It is, in fact, impossible to answer them with complete accuracy. However, Pistrak is not so much concerned with this period of Khrushchev's life as with his rise in the Ukraine, under the wing of Kaganovich, and later, again with the aid of Kaganovich, in Moscow. In his secret speech of February 1956, Khrushchev accused Stalin of creating the "cult of the individual," surrounding himself with flatterers and not permitting any opposition. On the basis of Khrushchev's own statements in the thirties and forties, Pistrak succeeds in proving that Khrushchev himself, more than any other of Stalin's retinue, was responsible for the emergence of this "cult of the individual." Malenkov, Kaganovich and even to some extent Molotov did not need to ingratiate themselves so much with Stalin, since they were well-known figures both in practical politics and in the realm of Communist theory. Comparing the personalities of Khrushchev and Malenkov, the author writes:

> Khrushchev did not belong to this group of Stalinist intellectuals. Politically, he grew up as simply an agitator and propagandist, and for the sake of advancement he was forced to look for other means to make himself appreciated. This becomes obvious from a comparison of the few superficial writings by Khrushchev with Malenkov's serious and interesting contributions to Party magazines. Stalin esteemed Malenkov's intellectual abilities highly, and because of this, Malenkov could spare some space in his writings and time in his speeches for serious discussions, rather than for excessive flatteries. For Khrushchev, however, subservience was the most important tool in paving his way to the top (pages 166–67).

Pistrak also deals with the role of Khrushchev in the Stalinist purges. He has no doubt that Khrushchev took part in the liquidation of Postyshev and Kossior. In his secret speech, Khrushchev accused Stalin of their liquidation, at the same time trying to clear himself of any responsibility. Yet he made no attempt to rehabilitate Kossior. Few people paid any attention to this, but, as Konrad Kellen points out in his book, the Soviet leader called Kossior only an "eminent Party figure." He did not even hint that Kossior had been innocent; he merely disagreed with the methods to which Stalin resorted.

Pistrak's book describes the atmosphere of intrigue, mistrust and fear that surrounded Khrushchev in his rise to power, but the portrait of Khrushchev remains obscure. This deficiency is avoided in Konrad Kellen's book. Whereas Pistrak presents a scholarly work based on research and concentrating on events, Kellen is more interested in Khrushchev, the man and his tactics. He is fascinated by the figure of the Communist who presses on over the corpses and ruined reputations of his former colleagues, devoid of conscience (in the Western sense), yet considers himself to be right. Nor is Kellen less interested in Khrushchev's dynamism, his ability to maneuver, his peasant cunning and daring. The figure created by Pistrak corresponds to reality, but he gives only a partial portrait. No doubt Khrushchev is not the intellectual equal of Malenkov or even Molotov, nevertheless he succeeded in winding them round his little finger and becoming sole heir to Stalin's empire. It is evident that, while he is a clever flatterer, he also possesses other qualities which have enabled him to attain his present position.

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Kellen considers Khrushchev's outstanding trait to be his penchant for remaining in the background and playing down his abilities. This, combined with his uncanny knack for catching the mood of the moment, brought him victory. He became First Secretary of the Party because the members of the Central Committee Presidium were unwilling to trust any of Stalin's better-known colleagues with the post, and thereafter he was able to ally himself with one faction against another in such a way that he constantly remained on the side of the majority. Whereas these alliances were regarded as permanent by the other pretenders to Stalin's throne, for Khrushchev they were only steps toward personal leadership in the Party. Kellen regards Malenkov as Khrushchev's chief rival. Once he was defeated, none of the other members of the Presidium presented any threat by themselves. The only danger lay in a coalition, but this he managed to forestall. He was the first to preach the need for strengthening the "collective leadership," and was the first to topple Stalin from his pedestal and denounce the "cult of the individual." But Khrushchev is to be judged by his deeds rather than his words. Thus, while he more than any other of Stalin's intimates was responsible for creating the "cult of the individual," at the decisive moment he showed himself to be more independent and original than his rivals, who did not know how to break those psychological threads which bound them to Stalin. After Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, his remaining opponents in the Central

Committee lost their trump card. They had only three alternatives: to follow Khrushchev along the road of de-Stalinization, to occupy a neutral position and thus lose contact with the current mood both of the popular and Party masses or to oppose de-Stalinization and thereby ruin their future chances. Khrushchev was the first to sense what the times required and he knew how to employ this initiative in the most decisive manner.

Kellen, however, does not limit himself to describing Khrushchev's activities. The personality of the man intrigues him. Does Khrushchev really believe that Communism will bury the West, that Communist society is the most just society, does he have no pangs of conscience regarding his part in the Stalinist purges? The author is convinced that his belief in the final victory of Communism is as sincere as his personal attachment to Communism:

> Is he a liar? Does he believe what he says? Is he sincere? In Communist semantics, these words do not mean what they do in the Western sense. As chief of a party which is not a party; as master over newspapers which are not newspapers; as chief executive of the Soviet Union, which is neither soviet nor a union, he is, at one level, always sincere (page 250).
>
> Is he a leader? During one conversation, Khrushchev told Richard Nixon that he had authored a piece on military affairs published in *Pravda* under the name of some general. Does it not attest to the intensity of his leadership that he writes other people's pieces, while, in the West, leaders often do not even write their own? In Western countries, men in leading positions are not always leaders. But the structure of the Soviet Union being what it is, no man is likely to sit in the Kremlin for long who is not an effective leader (pages 251–52).

Kellen is perfectly correct in asserting that it is impossible to retain leadership, even in a totalitarian state, by terror alone. It is necessary to have outstanding personal qualities and, most important, great dynamism, which Khrushchev unquestionably has. The danger for Khrushchev will arise when, owing to old age or some other reason, he loses this dynamism. But this is only a personal matter and need not affect the Communist system as a whole. As long as this system preserves its present internal vigor, Kellen feels it will be able to place someone of the Khrushchev type at its head.

Such are the positive qualities of Khrushchev personally and the Communist empire generally in its struggle against the free world. But there are also negative aspects, among them the fact that neither Khrushchev nor the other Soviet leaders understand the West. They are captives of their own ideology and their own political blindness. They actually believe that the Western economic system cannot exist without gigantic arms production, that the workers in the West are solely concerned with overthrowing the capitalist system and seizing power. Unfortunately, the West has not been able to take advantage of this fact, because the West suffers from a similar misunderstanding of Communism:

> . . . the observer who cannot bring himself to believe that Khrushchev and millions of others *really* believe what he himself does not believe will find it impossible to understand them. More difficult still, one must even surrender the comfortable

cliché that, except for rebels and fools, "they're all fanatics." Not every believer is a fanatic. In fact, Khrushchev seems to be one of those non-fanatical believers (page 264).

Kellen's conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that the authors of the other two books are in complete agreement with him on this point. Kellen ends his book with the following appeal to the free world:

> It is often said and widely felt that sacrifices are needed to win the cold war. What sacrifices? More arms? Harder work? Higher taxes? Hardly. The one sacrifice needed is one of the least expensive but at the same one of the greatest: to give up comfortable myths and slogans, and to make the truly heroic attempt to understand Khrushchev and his kind to the best of one's ability; to explore the labyrinth without fear and to accept the fact that Communism and Communists, while not incomprehensible, at least not altogether, are very complicated and that the truth about them is not reducible to a "simple truth" (pages 264–65).

This, then, is what unites all three authors; all are convinced that the danger confronting the free world today is extremely great, that the free world will never be able to win the cold war without knowledge of the problems involved, and, most important, without a realistic appraisal of the opponent's capabilities. Khrushchev's personality is not the least important factor to be assessed, since he is representative of the new tendencies in Communism in the post-Stalin period. All three authors consider Khrushchev an infinitely more dangerous enemy than Stalin, and call for a united effort in the present struggle, believing that Khrushchev's threat to "bury the West" is not mere propaganda but a quite realistic program, the realization of which will be impeded only if some brake is imposed on the political, military and, most important, the spiritual expansion of Communism.

A. Kashin

Publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR:

THE EAST TURKIC REVIEW, No. 4, 1961, 128 pp. (In English.)

The issue opens with A. Yurchenko's "Economic Management and 'Parochialism' in the Turkestan Republics," which deals with manifestations of "nationalist exclusiveness and parochialism" in local economic management in the national republics following the economic decentralization of 1957, and the measures taken by the central authorities to counter it.

In "The New Soviet Drive against Nationalism in Turkestan," P. Urban shows how the central authorities are striving to prove that the annexation of the non-Russian countries by the Tsarist empire was a progressive event.

"The Development of Tatar Culture and Language under the Soviets," by T. Davletshin, gives a historical survey of the development of Tatar culture and describes the present attempts of the Communist authorities to Russify the Tatar people.

"The Sultan-Galiev Movement after 1923," by H. Kazanly, traces the Moslem "National-Communist" movement headed by the Tatar Communist Sultan-Galiev from its beginnings to its suppression by Stalin's regime.

In his "Population Trends in the Kazakh SSR as Shown by the 1959 Census," Y. Mironenko quotes official Soviet statistics to show how Kazakhstan has changed during the past six or seven decades from a country with a predominantly Turkic population to one populated mainly by Slavs, thus making the Kazakhs a minority in their native land.

A. Hakimoglu's "Forty Years of Anti-Religious Propaganda" surveys the organized attempts of the Party and government to stamp out religion among the peoples of the Soviet Union.

H. Findeisen's "Bashkiria" deals with the history and ethnography of the Bashkir people, and Lydia Holubnychy's "Chinese Treatment of the Nationality Problem in Sinkiang" describes the deliberate attempts of the Chinese Communists to assimilate the Turkic population of Eastern Turkestan.

The issue also contains reviews of three recent publications.

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ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNION SOVIETICA, No. 1, 1961, 112 pp. (In Spanish.)

The first issue of the Institute's new Spanish-language review contains the following articles: "The Rise of Communism in Russia," by A. Yurchenko; "Factors Governing Soviet Foreign Policy," by A. Avtorkhanov; "The New Soviet Antireligious Campaign," by N. Teodorovich; "The State of Science in the Soviet Union," by A. Poplujko; "Changing Soviet Views on Arab Unification," by G. A. von Stackelberg; "The Soviet Attitude regarding Cultural Exchanges between East and West," by B. Litvinov; "Why the Soviet Union is Reducing its Armed Forces," by N. Galay; "A New History of the Soviet Communist Party," by H. Akhminov; "Industry and the Seven-Year Plan," by G. A. Vvedensky; "The University of the Friendship of Peoples," by P. Urban; "Soviet Scientists at the International Congress on Inorganic and Applied Chemistry," by M. Kitaev. The issue also contains a short bibliography.

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PROBLEMS OF SOVIET INTERNAL POLICY, Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1960, 140 pp. (in English), 170 pp. (in Russian).

This is a complete record of the Twelfth Institute Conference held in Munich on October 27–29, 1960. The texts of the following papers read at the conference are given in full: "Internal Political Developments under Khrushchev," by Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov; "The Soviet Dictatorship and the Intensified Building of Communism," by Alexander Yurchenko; "The Soviet Army and Domestic Policy," by Nikolai Galay (See *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 10); "The Problem of Youth," by Martin Stieger; "Education as a Means of Molding the New Soviet Man," by Ramazan Karcha; "Creation of a Homogeneous Soviet Nation," by Günther Stökl; "The Secretariat: Key to Power?" by Charles B. McLane. Summaries of the discussions which followed the presentation of the papers are also included.

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CAUCASIAN REVIEW, No. 10, 1961, 152 pp. (In English.)

The issue opens with A. Avtorkhanov's "Forty Years of Sovietization of Chechen-Ingushetia," which traces the repression to which this branch of the North Caucasian peoples was subjected under Stalin's regime, culminating in their mass deportation during World War II.

"A Survey of Contemporary North Caucasian Literature," by T. Tatlok, gives biographical details of the more prominent Soviet writers of the Northern Caucasus, showing how their talents have been exploited to serve Soviet policy and Communist propaganda.

In "Plant Propagation in Georgia," A. Arkhimovich gives an account of agriculture in Georgia and shows how this is developed, not in accordance with the needs of the Georgian people, but in accordance with the requirements of the central government.

In his article "The 1960 Conference of Azerbaidzhani Intelligentsia," D. Hadjibeyli describes the efforts of the central authorities to mobilize the intelligentsia for the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan by overcoming defects and deficiencies in technical organization and by increasing the number of trained and competent technical personnel.

"The Fortieth Anniversary of the Sovietization of Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia," by R. Takoev, underlines the price paid by the peoples of these North Caucasian autonomous republics in suffering, repression and the liquidation of their elite for the limited material progress achieved during the past forty years of Soviet rule.

L. Mikirtitchian's "The History of Motion Pictures in Soviet Armenia" reviews the development of the cinema in Armenia under Soviet rule. He stresses that the main preoccupation of the Communist authorities is the development of the cinema, not as a branch of art and culture, but rather as an instrument of Soviet Party propaganda at home and abroad.

The issue also contains six reviews, a chronicle of events, three bibliographies, two obituaries and an article on the activities of the Institute during the first decade of its existence.

INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES

Soviet Colonialism in Theory and Practice

The annual conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR was held in Munich on July 25–26, 1961 on the theme "Soviet Colonialism in Theory and Practice." The conference differed from those held in previous years in that, whereas earlier conferences had dealt with aspects of the political and economic policies of the Soviet Union which are discussed, albeit from an exclusively Communist point of view, in the Soviet press, the subject this year was one which never features in Soviet publications. It is a Soviet contention that colonialism is a phenomenon which is a peculiarity of the non-Communist world and therefore does not exist under the Soviet system. However, any attempt at a comprehensive survey of the subject inevitably involves a number of factors linked with the internal policy of the Soviet Communist Party.

Dr. Panas Fedenko's paper "The Main Features of Soviet Colonialism–A Colonialism of a New Type" dealt mainly with the historical material relating to the subject. He began by citing certain documentary evidence relating to the history of the Communist Party in the pre-Revolutionary period, suggesting that Lenin's statements in 1913 on the question of self-determination for the peoples of Russia might be taken as the fountainhead of Bolshevik tactics in their drive to form a new state entity. He further quoted documents dating from the early days of the new state and Stalin's statements during the civil war and traced the history of the establishment of Soviet regimes in the various republics as evidence of a deliberate policy to create a strictly centralized system. Dr. Fedenko analyzed in detail Party attempts to create Communist ruling nuclei in the Union and autonomous republics and the policy of entrenching Communist rule by offering each people the opportunity to form its own culture, national in form, but Communist in content. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that even among Communists in the various nationality groups there had arisen opposition to Soviet centralism and exploitation. His interpretation of the situation, based on historical findings, was that there exists in the Soviet Union a Russian imperial colonialism which is leading to the gradual extinction of the non-Russian nations, a trend which is facilitated by the existence of Russian chauvinism.

In his paper "The Colonial Policy of the Soviet Regime Toward the National Republics of the USSR," Anthony Adamovich dealt primarily with the theoretical aspect of the question and made the point that the weapon of "anticolonialism" forged by the Communists was quickly transformed into a boomerang. The author took as his starting point the theory propounded by Hans Kohn, the noted American specialist on the nationality problem, that there are five possible methods by which a policy of imperial expansion may be implemented, and built up his argument by providing proof that elements of all five methods are to be found in the process by which the Soviet system was extended throughout the former

Russian Empire. Professor Adamovich revealed the falseness of Communist claims that local autonomy exists in the Soviet Union and stressed that the position of many of the outlying republics was in no way different from that of colonies in other parts of the world. He made the one qualification that even the Great Russian people itself is reduced to what might be termed a "colonial" status in relation to the ruling class.

The papers by Dr. Hans Braeker and Stefan Stolte, "Soviet Policy Toward the Communist Countries with Special Reference to its Economic Aspects" and "Moscow's Comecon Empire–Colonialism or Liberation," were concerned, as the titles suggest, with the economic aspect of Soviet expansionism. The authors sketched in the successive stages of Soviet economic policy since the Revolution: first, Lenin's policy of cooperation with other countries, then, Stalin's theory of the two world markets, and finally, Khrushchev's plan for cooperation between socialist countries. They analyzed the economic situation which has prevailed in the countries of the Eastern bloc since "socialist internationalism" has become the guiding rule of interstate relations within the socialist camp, stressing the unique role played by Comecon, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, which despite its benign exterior serves as an instrument whereby Soviet requirements can be made the decisive factor in the economic planning of the East European Communist countries without any apparent curtailment of those countries' sovereignty. Soviet economic expansion, expressed in the formation of a socialist market, the authors asserted, possesses all the economic features of traditional types of colonialism.

Madame Suzanne Labin's paper on "The Political, Economic and Technical Activities of the Soviet Union in the Underdeveloped Countries" covered a considerably wider range than those of the other speakers. She surveyed the existing political and social situation in various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America with particular reference to the growing influence which Moscow is acquiring in these areas. She cited numerous examples to demonstrate the methods employed by Soviet representatives to exploit these countries in the struggle against the free world, at the same time referring to the blunders committed by the West, whether from ignorance, complacency or shortsightedness.

Professor E. Glovinsky's paper, "Soviet Economic Expansion in the Less Developed Countries," ably supplemented Madame Labin's work with a wealth of statistical data revealing the nature and scale of Soviet trade and aid in the newly-emerging nations.

The two remaining papers, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism," by Baymirza Hayit, and "Outer Mongolia: A Case Study of Soviet Colonialism," by Professor W. Ballis, provided examples of Soviet policy toward specific ethnographic and geographical areas. Professor Ballis, who has on four occasions visited the Soviet Union, made use of his personal experiences to demonstrate the insidious methods by which the Soviet Union extends its influence in backward countries.

Another feature of the 1961 conference which distinguished it from its predecessors was the fact that the formulation of the conference theme led to considerable discussion of the term "colonialism," and since even the main speakers were not altogether able to reach agreement as to its definition, it may with justification be asserted that a more precise term was required to define the subject. After the subject had been passed to the floor for discussion, it became evident that there were two main trends of opinion regarding this point. Some considered that colonialism as such did not exist in the Soviet Union; others, while accepting the formulation of the conference theme, felt compelled to qualify the phenomenon under review as a new type of colonialism. The protagonists of the former view pointed to the absence of exploitation of any particular people. Exploitation in the Soviet Union was universal, without consideration of nationality, profession, sex or age. Curtailment of liberty applied equally to Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and Kazakhs. Indeed, it was the Soviet government's policy, if only for tactical considerations, to encourage national culture. Proponents of the opposite point of view countered this argument by asserting that, all the same, such features of the Soviet regime as deprivation of human rights and various forms of exploitation were also features of colonialism.

A. Gaev

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

July 1961

1 Central Committee Presidium Candidate Member Pospelov receives Polish United Workers' Party delegation.

Khrushchev exchanges messages of greetings with Prime Minister of Afghanistan on thirtieth anniversary of signature of non-aggression pact between Afghanistan and the USSR.

Party delegation flies to Ulan-Bator to attend Fourteenth Congress of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

Decree of Supreme Soviet Presidium on harsher penalties for violation of currency regulations.

2 Delegation headed by M. Lesechko flies to Geneva to attend Thirty-Second Session of United Nations Economic and Social Council.

London Royal Ballet Company opens at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow.

3 Brezhnev receives Guinean Ambassador.

All-Union Congress of Mathematicians opens in Moscow.

Japanese Kabuki Theater opens in Moscow.

Khrushchev receives North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

4 Khrushchev and Brezhnev send message of greetings to President Kennedy to mark Independence Day.

Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yu arrives in Moscow from Geneva.

United States Ambassador holds Independence Day reception.

5 Speech by Party Secretary Suslov at Mongolian Party Congress in Ulan-Bator published.

Joint Soviet—North Vietnamese communiqué published.

Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev leaves Moscow for London to open Soviet Industrial Exhibition.

Foreign Minister Gromyko receives Chen Yu.

Luncheon held in honor of Chen Yu.

6 Japanese Ambassador arrives in Moscow.

Major Gagarin invited to attend forthcoming Seventh International Conference for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons in Japan.

Khrushchev speaks at Soviet—North Korean friendship meeting in Moscow.

Friendship and cooperation agreement between the USSR and North Korea signed in Moscow.

7 Statement made by US General Douglas MacArthur at Manila on July 5 published in the Soviet press.

Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Popović arrives in Moscow on an official visit.

Patolichev opens Soviet Industrial Exhibition in London.

Soviet—Polish agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy signed in Warsaw.

Gromyko receives newly-appointed UAR Ambassador.

Government reception to mark conclusion of All-Union Conference of Secondary School Workers.

Proposal for introduction of Kiev Defense Medal published.

United States note of June 17 on ending of atomic testing published.

8 Soviet reply to American note of June 17 published.

Exhibition of American plastics opens in Moscow.

Work started on construction of 450-km. section of "Friendship" oil pipeline in Belorussia.

Khrushchev speaks at reception in honor of cadets graduating from Soviet military academies.

200,000-kW turbine generator brought into operation as part of the Donbass power network.

Khrushchev receives Popović.

Soviet trade union delegation leaves Moscow for Peking.

Minister of Culture Furtseva receives American delegation attending Second International Film Festival in Moscow.

9 Air display on Tushino Airfield near Moscow to mark Soviet Air Force Day.

Announcement that Mongolian Premier Tse Den Bal had received injuries in an automobile accident and report on his health.

Ghanaian theater company arrives in the Soviet Union on tour.

Second International Film Festival opens in Moscow.

10 Khrushchev's message of welcome to participants in the Second International Film Festival published.

President Nkrumah of Ghana arrives in Moscow.

Ministry of Culture holds reception for members of the London Royal Ballet Company.

Photographs taken of stellar systems 10 million light years from earth by means of a new telescope at the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

11 Suslov's speech of July 10 at celebrations in Ulan-Bator of fortieth anniversary of Mongolian independence published.

Khrushchev receives Indian Ambassador.

Brezhnev receives Ecuadorian Vice-President.

Khrushchev speaks at luncheon held in honor of President Nkrumah.

Major reorganization and reequipment of Gorky Automobile Works begun.

12 Newly-appointed UAR Ambassador presents his credentials to Brezhnev.

First Deputy Premier Mikoyan receives group of Japanese businessmen staying in Moscow on holiday.

Seismic station at Sochi records ten earth tremors in one day, the most powerful being of force 2–3.

13 Report of record flight by Tu-114 aircraft which reached a height of 40,700 feet with a load of 30 tons.

Soviet governmental delegation headed by V. P. Elyutin leaves Moscow to attend opening of Rangoon Technological Institute and a hospital in Taung-gyi built by the USSR as a gift to the Burmese people.

New electron microscope with a magnification of 200,000 announced.

14 Delegation headed by M. Georgadze leaves Moscow on a goodwill tour of Latin American countries.

15 Ministry of Culture holds reception in honor of the Second International Film Festival.

16 Australian Consolidated Press extends invitation to Gagarin to visit Australia.

United States President's special assistant on disarmament John McCloy arrives in Moscow at the head of a delegation to take part in talks on disarmament.

Khrushchev's message of congratulations to new Finnish Premier published.

Announcement of visit of Nkrumah to Bratsk Hydroelectric Station, Irkutsk and Lake Baikal.

17 Ministry of Culture holds reception for members of Japanese Kabuki Theater.

Group of Soviet zoologists leaves Leningrad to take part in Second Joint Vietnamese Expedition to the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonking.

Sudanese Premier Abboud arrives in Moscow.

Soviet delegation flies to the United States to hold talks on establishing direct air communications between the USA and the USSR.

Newly-appointed Japanese Ambassador presents his credentials to Brezhnev.

Writer Olga Forsh dies.

18 Twentieth anniversary of Soviet–Czech agreement on cooperation in the war against Germany.

Announcement that the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions will be held in Moscow on December 4–16, 1961.

International Aeronautics Federation confirms records made by Gagarin during his flight of April 12.

Soviet–Bulgarian scientific and technical cooperation pact signed in Moscow.

Brezhnev receives Sudanese Premier.

Gromyko receives John McCloy.

19 Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin receives delegation of Finnish journalists.

20 Exchange of telegrams between Khrushchev and President De Gaulle on the occasion of Bastille Day published.

Report on talks held in the Kremlin between Sudanese Premier and Soviet representatives.

Ghanaian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Public Works arrive in Moscow.

Newly-appointed Nepalese Ambassador arrives in Moscow.

21 Half-yearly report on fulfillment of state economic plan published.

Brezhnev receives Norwegian Ambassador.

Deputy Premier Novikov receives Swiss Ambassador.

Announcement of Maurice Thorez' arrival in Moscow.

Hungarian economic delegation leaves Moscow for Budapest.

22 Nkrumah meets Soviet leaders in the Kremlin.

Report of second American manned space flight published.

Governmental delegation headed by V. P. Elyutin returns from Rangoon to the Soviet Union.

23 Speeches by Khrushchev and Sudanese Premier in Sochi published.

Khrushchev receives Maurice Thorez in Sochi.

Announcement of return from Baghdad of governmental delegation headed by RSFSR Foreign Minister S. G. Lanin.

24 Joint Soviet—Ghanaian communiqué signed in Moscow.

Squadron of Finnish warships visits Riga.

Report on visit to Cairo of delegation of Soviet journalists headed by Chairman of new Soviet press agency "Novosti" B. S. Burkov.

Chairman of All-Union Central Trade Union Council V. V. Grishin receives General Secretary of Trade Union Congress of Ghana.

25 World Youth Forum opens in Moscow.

Gromyko receives Ghanaian Foreign Minister.

Gromyko receives newly-appointed Nepalese Ambassador.

Parliamentary delegation from Cyprus arrives in Moscow.

Delegation of Soviet journalists flies from Moscow to Delhi.

26 Khrushchev receives John McCloy in Sochi.

Czechoslovakian economic delegation arrives in Moscow.

Bulgarian economic delegation arrives in Moscow.

Soviet—Rumanian scientific and technical cooperation agreement signed in Moscow.

27 Khrushchev receives Pham Van Dong in Sochi.

Nepalese Ambassador presents his credentials to Brezhnev.

Chairman of Gosplan V. N. Novikov receives Czechoslovakian economic delegation.

28 Joint Soviet—Sudanese communiqué published.

Central Committee Secretary Mukhitdinov receives Guinean Ambassador.

30 New Party Program published.

Soviet Navy Day.

31 Mikoyan receives retiring Norwegian Ambassador.

Changes and Appointments

1 Dzhabar Rasulov replaced by Anvar Kuchkarov as Ambassador to the Togo Republic.

11 S. P. Kiktev replaced by V. I. Kornev as Ambassador to the Lebanon in connection with his transfer to other duties.

17 O. A. Chukanov replaced by I. Kh. Yunak as First Secretary of the Tula Oblast Party Committee.

25 N. S. Konovalov appointed First Secretary of the Kaliningrad Oblast Party Committee.

26 N. P. Stakhanov replaced by V. S. Tikunov as Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR.

29 P. P. Udovchenko replaced by L. E. Kizyu as permanent representative of the Ukrainian SSR at the United Nations.

The first issue of the

New Series

Studies

on the

Soviet Union

has just been published

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